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ABSTRACT 
Drawing on two perspectives of accountability theory, this dissertation experimentally 
examines the joint effect of audit report content and investor type (i.e., primary shareholders of 
the firm) on audit committee members’ propensity to challenge management’s significant 
accounting estimates.  Findings indicate that audit committee members engage in the highest 
level of questioning when sophisticated investors are the primary shareholders of the firm and a 
standard, unqualified audit report is issued with no additional information about management’s 
significant accounting estimate.  By contrast, their questioning level is significantly lower when 
unsophisticated investors are the primary shareholders of the firm and/or when the audit report 
includes an explanatory paragraph about management’s significant accounting estimate.  Further 
analysis suggests this pattern of results is more pronounced for audit committee members who 
are designated as financial experts.  These findings have implications in terms of both research 
and practice inasmuch as facets of a recent PCAOB Exposure Draft advocates for widespread 
and required usage of explanatory paragraphs in audit reports that, herein, decrease audit 
committee’s propensity to challenge management and/or auditors.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation reports an experimental examination of the joint influence of audit report 
content and investor type (i.e., the primary shareholders of the firm) on the audit committees’ 
propensity to challenge management’s significant accounting estimates.  Specifically, I 
investigate whether and the extent to which explanatory paragraphs about significant accounting 
estimates in the audit report and the sophistication level of the firm’s primary shareholders 
interactively influence the degree to which audit committee members develop questions to ask 
management and/or the auditor about such estimates.  
Being fiduciaries of shareholders, audit committee members have the duty to effectively 
monitor the financial reporting and auditing processes (Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999).  The 
importance of this duty received increased attention following passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX, 2002)  and, more recently, following the financial crisis (Deloitte, 2010; Ernst & 
Young 2008).1  One significant way that audit committee members can fulfill their oversight 
duty is to challenge the judgments and assumptions underlying management’s critical financial 
statement estimates.  In fact, attendees of board meetings describe asking probing questions as 
the most important criterion for audit committee effectiveness (Beasley et al., 2009; Gendron and 
Bedard, 2006; Gendron et al., 2004).  A recent report by the National Association of Corporate 
Directors (NACD) also identifies questioning assumptions that underlie critical accounting 
estimates as one of ten principles audit committee members should follow to provide effective 
oversight on the financial reporting process (NACD, 2010).   
                                                          
1 SOX made audit committees directly responsible for appointing, compensating, retaining, and overseeing external 
auditors.  Moreover, under SOX, the external auditors must report directly to the audit committee rather than client 
management.  The reports issued by Deloitte and Ernst & Young both emphasize that the recent financial crisis calls 
for additional audit committee scrutiny in terms of risk oversight, review of earnings press releases, and oversight of 
internal controls and financial reporting.   
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Failing to be active and ask challenging questions may lead to substantial penalties.  One 
infamous example is the case of WorldCom where board members, while not explicitly involved 
in the fraud, were sanctioned (up to 20% of the net worth) for their passiveness in not asking 
critical questions, allowing for the fraud to sustain (Kaplan and Kiron, 2004).  Despite historic 
and recently heightened concern about the extent to which audit committee members challenge 
management’s significant accounting estimates, few studies have investigated determinants of 
such challenges or conditions that amplify or attenuate the effects of specific determinants.   This 
dissertation provides theory and empirical evidence to address these issues.   
Theory developed herein first addresses the likely dampening effect of more disclosure about 
management’s estimates in the audit report on audit committee members’ propensity to challenge 
the estimates.  It then subsequently develops alternative predictions about how investor type may 
moderate the extent of this decrease.  Along with management and external auditors, audit 
committee members are an integral part of the financial reporting supply chain who face 
complex accountabilities (Gibbins and Mason, 1988).  Therefore, situational determinants of 
audit committee members’ perceived accountabilities will affect how a requirement to disclose 
new information about management’s estimates in the audit report influence their propensity to 
challenge these estimates.     
While audit committee members generally are accountable to protect shareholders’ interests, 
they are likely to be held accountable to diverse other parties in times of negative events (e.g., 
financial statement restatements).  Consistent with this idea, audit committee members of firms 
issuing income-decreasing restatements, compared to firms that issue no or income-increasing 
restatements, face greater turnover and higher likelihood of losing positions in other companies’ 
audit committees (Srinivasan, 2005).    Ex ante, however, it is not clear whether audit committees’ 
3 
 
perceived risk of being held accountable for potential adverse financial statement outcomes or 
the internal sense of responsibility to protect shareholders is the more influential mechanism 
underlying their behavior.  Hence, I use two different perspectives of accountability -- self-
serving vs. altruistic (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Sinclair et al, 2010) -- to predict alternative 
ways that audit report content and investor type jointly will influence audit committee members’ 
propensity to challenge management’s estimates.  
Both the self-serving and altruistic perspectives of accountability theory predict that greater 
disclosure in audit reports about management’s estimates will decrease audit committee 
members’ propensity to challenge auditors and/or management.  These perspectives, however, 
differ in their predictions for the effect of investor type as well as the joint effects of investor 
type and audit report content on audit committee members’ propensity to challenge 
management’s significant estimates.  That is, competing hypotheses are warranted based on the 
two different perspectives.  First, the self-serving perspective warrants predicting audit 
committee members will feel more accountable, and hence challenge management and/or 
auditors to a greater extent, when the firm’s primary shareholders are sophisticated, as opposed 
to unsophisticated, investors.  It further predicts that greater disclosure about management’s 
estimates in the audit report will more substantially decrease their propensity to question 
management and/or auditors when the investor base is sophisticated instead of unsophisticated.   
Conversely, the altruistic perspective predicts that audit committee members will feel more 
responsible to challenge management and/or auditors when the investor base is more vulnerable 
(i.e., unsophisticated).  Given such greater salience in the need to protect unsophisticated 
investors, it further predicts that greater disclosure about management’s estimates in the audit 
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report will more extensively decrease audit committee members’ propensity to challenge the 
estimates when the investor base is unsophisticated instead of sophisticated.    
To test these predictions, I conduct an online experiment using a 2 x 2 design, with audit 
report content and investor type as between-subject factors.  Participants are predominantly 
experienced audit committee members who assume that role for a hypothetical public 
manufacturing firm.  They receive an overview of the firm’s operations and information about a 
significant accounting estimate related to obsolete inventory. Management has favorably revised 
this estimate late in the audit process and moderately argues for their case. The audit committee 
participants’ main task is to develop questions regarding the significant accounting estimate.  
Overall, the experimental findings are more consistent with the self-serving, instead of the 
altruistic, perspective.  Consistent with both perspectives, however, audit committee members 
become significantly less likely to challenge management’s estimate when greater disclosure 
about the estimate appears in the audit report.  Consistent (inconsistent) with the self-serving 
(altruistic) perspective, though, audit committee members ask significantly more questions given 
a sophisticated, as opposed to an unsophisticated, investor base.  Moreover, when there is greater 
disclosure about the estimates in the audit report, audit committee members’ propensity to 
challenge management’s estimates drops to a significantly greater extent given a sophisticated, 
as opposed to an unsophisticated investor base.   
Additional analysis provides further support for the self-serving perspective: Designated 
financial experts, who are relatively more likely to perceive self-serving accountability compared 
to audit committee members without this designation (but no more likely to be altruistic, a priori) 
are largely responsible for driving this pattern of findings.  Especially for designated financial 
experts, minimization of potential accountability risks, rather than an internal sense of 
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responsibility to protect unsophisticated shareholders, appears to be the stronger accountability 
mechanism underlying the decision processes of audit committee members.                
This dissertation makes several contributions.  First, it enhances our understanding with 
respect to audit committee members’ decision processes, especially in terms of factors that are 
likely to affect their propensity to challenge management’s significant accounting estimates.  
Specifically, I identify audit report content and investor type as co-determinants of the level of 
questioning audit committee members engage in when overseeing the financial reporting and 
auditing processes.  Second, I address the call for research on “unintended (behavioral) 
consequences” of attempts to regulate audit committee members (Turley and Zaman, 2004) by 
providing evidence on how greater disclosure about significant accounting estimates in the audit 
report, may decrease audit committee oversight, acting more like a substitute than a complement 
or amplifier of increased audit committee’s diligence.  Finally, this dissertation adds to the 
expertise and corporate governance literatures by demonstrating that, while designated financial 
experts have a greater capacity to challenge management’s estimates, a potentially troubling 
boundary condition is an unsophisticated investor base, as investor protection has been a 
longstanding goal for standard setters and regulators.     
The remaining chapters are organized as follows.  Chapter 2 provides background on the 
concern regarding audit committee’s propensity to challenge management’s accounting estimates 
and the debate on providing greater disclosure in the audit report.  Chapter 3 summarizes 
relevant literature and chapter 4 develops the specific hypotheses.  Chapter 5 provides an 
overview of the experimental method and chapter 6 discusses the results.  Chapter 7 presents 
supplemental analyses and Chapter 8 concludes.     
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II. BACKGROUND 
Do Audit Committee Members Challenge Management’s Accounting Estimates? 
The need to protect investors, especially those who are unsophisticated, has been a 
longstanding issue.  For decades the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), for example, 
prohibited the inclusion of projections in filings under the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts out of 
concern that the projections may “become traps for the unsophisticated who would be prone to 
attach more significance to such projections than they deserve” (SEC, 1969). In other words, the 
need to protect unsophisticated investors outweighed the objective of supplying the investment 
community with meaningful information.  Similarly, the Securities Industry Association (SIA) 
expressed concern regarding Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD) in that unsophisticated 
investors may misinterpret, and thus be unable to take advantage of the access to information 
mandated by Regulation FD (SIA, 2001).  Concern related to investor protection has led to 
various rules imposing fiduciary duties to various professions in the financial industry, such as 
accountants and audit committee members, to protect investors unable to sufficiently protect 
their own interests.2  
Despite the fact audit committee members owe fiduciary duty to shareholders, commentators 
and regulators have expressed concern about the extent to which they actually adhere to such 
duties.  A specific concern is failure to challenge or validate the assumptions that underlie 
significant accounting estimates (NACD, 2010).  It is frequently emphasized that firm 
management compensates audit committee members.  This economic bond may lead to 
                                                          
2 Under Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act), 
the SEC is currently in the process of adopting a rule imposing a fiduciary duty on brokers-dealers and their 
representatives as well when they provide personalized investment advice (SEC, 2011). 
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conditions in which audit committee members, consciously or subconsciously, try to please firm 
management, even at the cost of shareholder interests.3     
Should the Audit Report Disclose More Information about Management’s Estimates? 
The audit report is the primary means of communication by the auditors to third-party 
financial statement users.  Although current reporting standards (SAS 58; AU Section 508) 
provide auditors the option to append an emphasis-of-matter paragraph to the standard 
unqualified audit report when auditors consider it necessary to draw the attention of financial 
statement users to issues that are important to their understanding of the financial statements, 
such option is rarely exercised (aside from going concern issues).  Accordingly, the current 
pass/fail reporting model has been criticized for providing little to no information to financial 
statement users (PCAOB, 2011).   
Attempting to engineer an audit report that would provide more relevant information to 
financial statement users, the PCAOB Standing Advisory Group (SAG) launched a project called 
the “Auditor Reporting Model Project” (SAG meeting, July 2010). 4   Consistent with the 
PCAOB’s initiative to revise the audit report, Peecher et al. (2011) also propose modifying the 
audit report to disclose more information about the audit process as one of several 
recommendations that, taken as a whole, would shift auditors’ accountability away from just 
penalties for bad outcomes and towards rewards for better judgment processes.  Overall, both 
regulators and academic researchers are proposing changes be made to the audit report to 
                                                          
3 Magilke et al., (2009) find that the objectivity of experimental participants in the role of audit committee members 
is compromised to a greater extent when they receive stock-based vs. cash compensation.   
4 A related concept release was issued on June 21, 2011 which was open for public comment until September 30, 
2011.  The PCAOB also held a public roundtable on September 15, 2011 to obtain additional insights on the 
alternatives for changing the audit report.    
8 
 
promote greater disclosure of information related to the audit process.  What information is most 
needed by financial statement users and thus should be included in the new audit report is a 
subject of intense debate.5  
Among various thoughts being discussed, one potential idea gaining interest is the concept of 
providing additional information regarding judgments underlying significant accounting 
estimates in the audit report.  The findings of the surveys conducted by the PCAOB staff and 
Investor Advisory Group (IAG) indicate that many investors (79% of the survey respondents) 
believe they need more information about auditor’s assessments of management’s judgments and 
estimates (PCAOB Open Board Meeting, 2011).6 Therefore, including information regarding 
judgments underlying management’s significant accounting estimates in the audit report, would 
indeed be a step towards meeting the information requested by financial statement users.   
However, it is yet unclear on how such increased emphasis on financial statement estimates 
in the audit report may affect the decision processes of the people involved in the financial 
reporting supply chain (i.e., managers, auditors, and audit committee members).  This 
dissertation provides theory-based empirical evidence regarding this issue by investigating the 
                                                          
5 The form of the modified audit report is also under deliberation.  The various possibilities being discussed include 
adding an additional emphasis paragraph to the standard audit report, expanding the audit report to include the 
content relating to the audit and management’s significant judgments (i.e. long-form report; variant of the French 
model), or requiring auditors to provide a supplemental report similar to the management discussion and analysis 
(MD&A) section of a company’s annual report regarding judgments made by the auditor while retaining the current 
pass/fail model.       
6 Respondents also wanted more disclosure about auditors’ assessment of management’s accounting policies and 
practices (65%), discussion of sensitivity analysis performed by auditors in significant judgment areas (65%), and 
discussion of key issues included in the summary memorandum (54%).  In their comment letters to the SEC 
Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting (2008), institutional investors as well as various 
investor groups also expressed a preference for greater disclosure regarding significant assumptions, estimates, and 
qualitative discussion of risks and uncertainties. 
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conditions under which such extended disclosure may decrease audit committee’s propensity to 
challenge management’s significant accounting estimates.  
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Effect of Additional Disclosure in the Audit Report 
Extant studies on the effect of additional disclosures in the audit report suggest additional 
disclosure in the audit report can be beneficial.  Fisher (1990) and Davis (2007) report evidence 
that public disclosures of materiality in the audit report increase market efficiency, ultimately 
benefiting financial statement users.  The survey results of Manson and Zaman (2001) also 
document that various disclosures in the audit report, such as disclosure of materiality, auditor’s 
assessment of the going concern status, findings related to fraud, and the extent of reliance on 
internal controls, can decrease the expectations gap.  Such findings are relevant to this 
dissertation as explanatory paragraphs could include materiality disclosures.       
While these studies suggest additional disclosure in the audit report can be beneficial, they 
focus on how such disclosure will affect the users of the financial statement and the market 
outcome, without considering the effects that may occur with respect to the decision processes of 
other members of the financial reporting supply chain (e.g., audit committee members, auditors, 
etc.).  This dissertation extends this line of literature by experimentally examining how increased 
disclosure in the audit report regarding management’s significant accounting estimates influence 
audit committee members’ behaviors.  
Audit Committee Effectiveness 
Extant archival research regarding audit committees uses several indirect proxies for audit 
committee effectiveness, including measures of financial reporting quality (Abbott et al., 2000; 
Beasley et al., 2000; Klein, 2002), the likelihood of employing external auditors who are industry 
specialists (Abbott and Parker, 2000), suspicious auditor switches (Archambeault and DeZoort, 
2001), and the strength of relationship with internal auditors (Raghunandan et al., 2001; 
11 
 
Scarbrough et al., 1998).  Among the various independent factors examined with respect to their 
association with audit committee effectiveness, audit committee members’ independence and 
expertise are the ones most extensively studied.  Specifically, study results show audit 
committees with more independent members to be more likely associated with higher audit 
committee effectiveness (Abbott et al., 2000; Abbott and Parker, 2000; Archambeault and 
DeZoort, 2001; Beasley et al., 2000; Klein, 2002; Raghunandan et al., 2001; Scarbrough et al., 
1998).  Further, greater financial expertise of audit committee members has also been found to 
be an important component of audit committee effectiveness.  Specifically, McMullen and 
Raghunandan (1996) find that companies with financial reporting problems, compared to those 
that do not have such problems, were less likely to have CPAs on their audit committees.  
Moreover, companies with suspicious auditor switches, compared to those with no such events, 
were more likely to have fewer audit committee members with experience in accounting, 
auditing, or finance (Archambeault and DeZoort, 2001).      
Much of the behavioral-experimental audit committee studies measures audit committee 
effectiveness in terms of the extent to which audit committee members support auditors in the 
context of auditor-management disagreements and negotiations (Knapp, 1987; DeZoort and 
Salterio, 2001; DeZoort et al., 2003a; DeZoort et al., 2003b; DeZoort et al., 2008).  Recent 
survey findings, however, indicate that audit committee members are rarely involved in resolving 
auditor-client negotiations (Gibbins et al., 2001; Cohen et al., 2002; Gibbins et al., 2007).  For 
example, in their interviews regarding CFO’s perspective on auditor-client negotiations, Gibbins 
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et al. (2001) find that the CFOs did not involve the audit committee early in the negotiation 
process and frequently informed them only after the issue had been resolved.7   
Building on such survey evidence suggesting that audit committee members usually are not 
involved in negotiated accounting decisions, Pomeroy (2010) examines audit committee 
effectiveness in terms of how audit committee members investigate secondary information (i.e., 
negotiated accounting decisions).  Specifically, the study measures audit committee effectiveness 
in terms of the extent to which audit committee members ask probing questions related to a 
negotiated accounting decision.  Findings indicate that audit committee members’ knowledge 
about the negotiation process increases their discomfort but without increasing how extensively 
they investigate the accounting decision.  More reassuringly, the study finds audit committee 
members more extensively investigate when management’s accounting is relatively aggressive.   
Despite the increasing interest on audit committee members’ judgment and decision-making 
process, we still know little about the determinants of audit committee members’ propensity to 
more or less thoroughly exercise their fiduciary duty to actively question management and/or 
auditors to gain comfort about the integrity of the financial reporting and auditing processes.  
This dissertation enhances our understanding regarding such determinants by examining how 
audit report content and investor type jointly affect audit committee members’ propensity to 
challenge management’s significant accounting estimates.  I next develop theory and discuss my 
specific predictions.   
  
                                                          
7 Gibbins et al. (2007) observe that the audit committee or its chair was informed immediately of the issue in only 9 % 
of and the cases and the audit committee chair was involved in the resolution only about 33% of the cases.  The 
audit committee was informed of the negotiated result 93% of the cases.  
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IV. THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
Two Perspectives of Accountability 
The theory of accountability used in the accounting and psychological literature concerns 
how individuals cope with different socio-economic pressures (Gibbins and Newton, 1994; 
Lerner and Tetlock, 1994, 1999; Peecher 1996, Tetlock, 1983, Tetlock et al., 1989).  Specifically, 
the theory predicts that individuals develop different social and cognitive strategies for coping 
with accountability to obtain acceptance from, or avoid conflict with important interpersonal or 
institutional audiences.8  In other words, the concept of accountability is typically viewed to have 
a self-serving motivation.       
However, self-interest is not the only motivation underlying accountability.  Researchers in 
the field of sociology and management suggest altruistic reasons can also motivate accountability 
(Dicke, 2002; Heinrich, 2007, Sinclair et al, 2010).  For example, Dicke (2002) states that 
“stewardship theories have been proposed as a basis for ensuring accountability in contracted 
human services.”  From this perspective, an internal sense of responsibility, rather than 
protection of self-interest, is the core motivation underlying accountability.  
Audit committee members are generally accountable towards protecting shareholders’ 
interests, but they also have the incentive to minimize being accountable for negative financial 
outcomes.  Ex ante, however, it is unclear whether the incentive to avoid such potential 
accountability (i.e., protection of self-interest) or the internal sense of accountability towards 
protecting shareholders (i.e., altruistic motivation) is the underlying mechanism of audit 
committee members’ behaviors.  Hence, I examine the joint effects of audit report content and 
                                                          
8 One example is the acceptability heuristic in which people show strategic shifts in public positions to 
accommodate known views of evaluative audiences.    
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investor type on audit committee members’ propensity to challenge management’s estimates 
under the two different perspectives of accountability (self-serving vs. altruistic).       
Effect of Additional Disclosure in the Audit Report 
Prediction Based on the Self-Serving Perspective of Accountability  
According to the accountability theory under the self-serving perspective, people exert 
greater cognitive effort in their decision processes when accountability pressure triggers the 
motivation to be accurate (Tetlock, 1992; Stapel et al., 1998) by engaging in a more extensive 
information gathering process (Gibbins and Newton, 1994).  In the context of the financial 
reporting process, investors will have a preference for objective, accurate information.  
Accordingly, increased accountability pressure from investors will trigger a motivation to be 
accurate in the minds of audit committee members and increase their propensity to challenge 
management’s significant accounting estimates.        
From the self-serving perspective, the likelihood of being culpable for negative financial 
statement outcomes will positively affect audit committee members’ perceived accountability.9  
Greater disclosure in the audit report may be one factor that lowers audit committee members’ 
culpability and thus, decrease their level of perceived accountability toward investors.  To 
elaborate, additional disclosure in the audit report may serve as a token of defense for audit 
committee members against being the target of public scrutiny in the event of negative outcomes, 
triggering a feeling of protection.  This, in turn, will likely decrease their level of perceived 
accountability and ultimately reduce their propensity to challenge management’s estimates.  Cain 
et al. (2005) use the concept of “moral licensing” to discuss a similar phenomenon in the context 
                                                          
9 Schmidt and Rasmussen (2012) find that shareholders withhold at least five percent more votes from ineffective 
audit committee members failing in their oversight duty versus effective audit committee members.  
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of disclosing conflicts of interest.  They assert that greater disclosure can reduce the information 
provider’s feeling of guilt about misleading users of the information, thereby triggering a moral 
license to bias the information further than they would without disclosure.  Monin and Miller 
(2001) also discuss an analogous phenomenon using the term “self-licensing.”  They show that 
once people demonstrate that they are not morally corrupt in some way, they are more likely to 
display exactly this corruption on subsequent tasks.  These theories predict audit committee 
members likely will perceive the additional disclosure in the audit report as a way of 
demonstrating their oversight duty and hence treat it as if it were a “license” to soften how much 
they challenge management’s estimates.  So, from the self-serving perspective of accountability, 
audit committee members’ propensity to challenge management’s estimate will likely decrease 
with greater disclosure about management’s estimates in the audit report.  
Prediction Based on the Altruistic Perspective of Accountability  
Being designated as fiduciaries of shareholders, it is reasonable to assume audit committee 
members will have an internal sense of responsibility towards protecting shareholders who are 
unable to directly monitor the financial reporting process themselves.  In this respect, 
challenging management’s significant accounting estimates can be regarded as a way audit 
committee members cope with accountability triggered for altruistic reasons.   
The psychological theory of helping behavior identifies the severity of the need for aid as the 
primary determinant of one’s engagement in altruistic behavior (Bekkers and Wiepking, 2010).10  
Findings in the social psychology literature on helping behavior confirm such theory by showing 
that the degree of need for help is positively related to the likelihood that help will be given 
                                                          
10 Other determinants include economical and psychological costs and benefits, reputation, efficacy, etc.  See 
Bekkers and Wiepking (2010) for a more comprehensive overview of psychological research on helping behavior.  
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(Levitt and Kornhaber, 1977; Staub and Baer, 1974; West and Brown, 1975).  Wagner and 
Wheeler (1969) further suggest that subjective perceptions of needs, rather than objective needs, 
are what motivate people’s altruistic behavior.  More recently, Zucker and Weiner (1993) and 
Weiner (1995) find that affective reactions to such cognitive perceptions, such as a feeling of 
sympathy towards the target in need, determine altruistic behavior.  Overall, the theory of 
helping behavior postulate a motivational sequence of thinking-feeling-acting to underlie 
altruistic behavior and provides a basis for examining audit committee members’ propensity to 
challenge management’s estimates under the altruistic perspective of accountability.  Specifically, 
the altruistic perspective warrants predicting audit committee members will treat the additional 
disclosure in the audit report as a substitute for their due diligence in protecting shareholders.  
This, in turn, will decrease their perception regarding investors’ need for help, ultimately 
stimulating a lower sense of responsibility to challenge management’s estimates.  
In sum, both the self-serving and altruistic perspective of accountability warrants predicting 
greater disclosure about management’s estimates in the audit report will lower audit committee 
members’ propensity to challenge the estimates.  However, this effect will likely be moderated 
by who forms the firm’s primary investor base.    
Effect of Investor Type  
Prediction Based on the Self-Serving Perspective of Accountability  
The theory of accountability implies that audit committee members will likely develop 
different strategies in coping with the accountability depending on the type of investors that form 
the majority of the firm’s investor base.  From the self-serving perspective, one way individuals 
cope with accountability demands, especially when it triggers a motivation to be accurate, is by 
engaging in self-discovery.  Self-discovery refers to the act of gathering information to determine 
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one’s own personal position (Gibbins and Newton, 1994).  Asking challenging questions about 
issues that arise during the financial reporting and auditing process requires audit committee 
members to anticipate issues that may hinder the objectivity of the information disclosed in the 
financial statements and to obtain a neutral, objective view on such issues.  In this respect, 
challenging management’s significant estimates can be considered a way in which audit 
committee members engage in self-discovery as a way of coping with accountability demands 
and thus, minimize potential accountability risk.     
Cognitive sophistication of the potential audience is one factor that affects the extent to 
which one engages in self-discovery.  Specifically, theory predicts that greater sophistication of 
an audience increases accountability pressure, leading to greater cognitive effort in the 
information gathering process (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 1999).  This suggests that 
audit committee members will challenge management’s estimates to a greater extent when the 
firm’s primary shareholders are institutional investors who are perceived to be more 
sophisticated than individual investors.   
Moreover, prior literature suggests that the presence of a high level of sophisticated, 
institutional investors increase the probability of shareholder activism (Carleton, Nelson, and 
Weisbach, 1998; Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999; Karpoff et al., 1996; Ryan and Schneider, 
2002; Smith, 1996) which can result in negative consequences such as a change in board 
composition (Smith, 1996) or a decrease in firm value (Karpoff, 2001).11  An increase in the 
likelihood of shareholder activism will likely increase the audit committee members’ perceived 
accountability risk.  This, in turn, will increase their propensity to challenge management’s 
                                                          
11 Shareholder activism refers to the use of power by an investor to bring about changes in the organizational 
structure of firms and include implementing confidential voting, creating shareholder advisory committees, altering 
board composition, etc.   
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estimates as a way of minimizing their probability of experiencing negative consequences that 
may occur in the event of shareholder activism.  Hence, from the self-serving perspective, audit 
committee members will show a greater propensity to question management’s estimates when 
the firm’s investor base consists largely of sophisticated as opposed to unsophisticated investors. 
Prediction Based on the Altruistic Perspective of Accountability  
Recall that the theory of helping behavior identifies the severity of the need for aid as the 
primary determinant of altruistic behavior.  Hence, from the altruistic perspective, investors who 
are more vulnerable (i.e., in greater need), compared to those who are less vulnerable will likely 
evoke a greater sense of responsibility from the audit committee.  This, in turn, likely will lead to 
greater cognitive effort, and thus, greater questioning (i.e., more extensive help) to be exerted.    
Investor vulnerability is likely to be a function of their sophistication level.  Specifically, 
greater knowledge and investment experience (i.e., higher sophistication) is likely to stimulate 
greater detection of financial misstatements, should they exist.  Sophisticated investors are also 
more likely to have diversified portfolios, reducing their overall level of investment risk.  Hence, 
sophisticated investors are likely to be perceived as being less vulnerable compared to their 
relatively unsophisticated counterparts. 12   Accordingly, from the altruistic perspective, audit 
committee members will show a greater propensity to challenge management’s estimates when 
the firm’s investor base consists largely of unsophisticated (i.e., more vulnerable), as opposed to 
sophisticated (i.e., less vulnerable), investors. 
  
                                                          
12 In the context of this study, investors are characterized as dedicated investors with long-term investment strategies.  
Hence, the term sophisticated (unsophisticated) investors refer to dedicated-sophisticated (dedicated-unsophisticated) 
investors.  More extensive elaboration regarding this assumption is provided in the experimental design section.  
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Joint Effects of Audit Report Content and Investor Type 
The reasoning thus far may seem to allow for predicting two main effects: one for the content 
of the audit report and another for investor type on the overall level of audit committee members’ 
questioning behavior.  However, theory actually warrants predicting an ordinal interaction 
between these two factors.   
From the self-serving perspective, a salient concern is the behavior of sophisticated investors 
as shareholder activism is positively associated with a higher level of sophisticated, institutional 
ownership.  By contrast, the behaviors of unsophisticated investors are a less salient concern 
from this perspective.  Accordingly, greater disclosure in the audit report, which will likely 
trigger a feeling of protection against shareholder activism, will decrease audit committee’s 
perceived accountability to a greater extent given sophisticated, as opposed to unsophisticated, 
investors.  In other words, when there is greater disclosure in the audit report, audit committee 
members’ propensity to challenge management’s estimates will decrease to a greater extent when 
the firm’s investor base is sophisticated, instead of unsophisticated.  This predicted interaction of 
audit report content and investor type based on the self-serving perspective is hypothesized in 
H1a.  Panel A of Figure 1 also depicts the predicted pattern of the interaction.   
H1a: Audit committee members’ propensity to challenge management’s significant 
estimates is greatest when there is less disclosure and the primary shareholders are 
sophisticated, lower when there is less disclosure and the primary shareholders are 
unsophisticated, and lowest when there is greater disclosure.   
 
The altruistic perspective of accountability predicts a variation of this pattern.  Specifically, 
the vulnerability of unsophisticated, as opposed to sophisticated, investors is a more salient 
concern to audit committee members from this perspective.  Accordingly, audit committee 
members will likely perceive greater disclosure in the audit report to be of greater help for more 
vulnerable, unsophisticated investors than for less vulnerable, sophisticated investors.  Greater 
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disclosure about management’s significant accounting estimate, thus, will likely reduce audit 
committee members’ propensity to challenge management’s estimates to a greater extent given 
unsophisticated, as opposed to sophisticated, investors.  This predicted interaction of investor 
type and audit report content based on the altruistic perspective is hypothesized in H1b.  Panel B 
of Figure 1 also illustrates the predicted interaction.  
H1b:  Audit committee members’ propensity to challenge management’s significant 
estimates is greatest when there is less disclosure and the primary shareholders are 
unsophisticated, lower when there is less disclosure and the primary shareholders are 
sophisticated, and lowest when there is greater disclosure.   
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V. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD 
Design and Participants 
Independent Variables 
I employ a full factorial 2 x 2 between subject online experiment, with audit report content 
and investor type as manipulated independent variables.  Audit report content is manipulated at 
two levels (lower vs. higher disclosure) with the requirement to include commentary on 
management’s significant accounting estimates in the audit report being either present (higher 
disclosure) or absent (lower disclosure). 
Investor type is also manipulated at two levels (lower vs. higher sophistication) using 
information regarding the firm’s primary shareholders.  Specifically, participants are either 
informed that 85% of the investor base consists of unsophisticated vs. sophisticated investors.13    
The extant financial accounting literature commonly categorizes investors into four different 
groups on the basis of their level of sophistication (sophisticated vs. unsophisticated) and 
investment strategy (i.e., transient vs. dedicated).  Transient investors refer to those with a 
shorter-term horizon and momentum focus, while dedicated investors refer to those with a 
longer-term horizon and valuation focus (Bushee, 1998; 2001; Ke and Petroni, 2004; Ke and 
Ramalingegowda, 2005; Elliott et al., 2010).  Considering such characteristics, transient-
sophisticated investors, who likely take advantage of unsophisticated investors, may be 
perceived as being the least vulnerable, while dedicated-unsophisticated investors may be 
                                                          
13 The manipulation of investor type in such manner may simultaneously trigger different thoughts about the 
fundamental characteristics of the hypothetical firm – such as its size, growth, information asymmetry, etc.  To the 
extent participants connect the investor type manipulation with such natural correlates, however, will be an 
intermediary dependent response which is not a property of my manipulation per se.  Hence, it will not alter my 
predictions on how investor type will affect audit committee members’ level of questioning under the two different 
perspectives of accountability.  
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perceived to be the most vulnerable to financial misstatements.  However, the presence of a large 
number of transient-sophisticated investors may increase audit committee’s concern for potential 
exploitation of the minority of unsophisticated investors.  In order to control for such secondary 
effect related to the investor group, only the level of investor sophistication is used to manipulate 
the different types of investors, while holding investment strategy constant across conditions.   
Dependent Variables 
The primary dependent variable, audit committee members’ propensity to challenge 
management’s significant estimates, is examined in terms of the level and nature of questioning 
audit committee members engage in.  Specifically, I use the total number of questions and the 
number of probing questions audit committee members ask after receiving information related to 
a significant accounting estimate as the primary measure of their propensity to challenge the 
auditor and/or management.  I also ask the participants to indicate their preferred extent of 
questioning about management’s estimate as well as their likelihood of asking questions on 
behalf of investors on six different issues as a secondary measure of their propensity to engage in 
questioning behavior.  The six issues include 1) auditor’s procedures to validate management’s 
write-off, 2) instructions given to the physical inspection team, 3) whether the auditor attempted 
to independently assess the amount of obsolete inventory, 4) whether the company would be able 
to continue as a going concern if the old inventory turns out to be unsellable, 5) management’s 
reasoning on why they believe the cost of obsolete inventory can be recovered and 6) the extent 
to which auditors and management believe the new estimate is more reasonable compared to the 
initial estimate.   
Questions are also asked to examine the process in which the two independent variables (i.e., 
audit report content and investor type) affect the primary dependent variable (i.e., audit 
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committee’s propensity to engage in questioning behavior).  Specifically, I ask participants to 
indicate their belief regarding the likelihood that the difference between the revised and original 
estimate is causing a material misstatement and their comfort level related to 1) the change in 
management’s estimate, 2) auditor’s decision to allow management’s updated, smaller write-
down, and 3) the difference in the resulting net income amount due to the different estimates for 
obsolete inventory.   
I also control for the possibility of participants’ overall tendency to support external auditors 
compared to management affecting their questioning behavior, by asking them to indicate their 
level of support regarding a 5% increase in audit fees proposed by the auditors.  Table 1 maps 
the different dependent measures with their corresponding construct of interest and the figure in 
Appendix A summarizes the experimental design using the predictive validity framework 
(Runkel and McGrath, 1972; Libby 1981).  
Participants 
Participants were individuals who either possess audit committee experience or are 
considered eligible for serving on an audit committee. 14   The individuals were invited to 
participate in the experiment via e-mail through the alumni association of the college of business 
at a Big 10 university and also through professional networks.15  Case materials and procedures, 
which are described in detail in the following section, were designed to ensure that participants 
were randomly assigned to experimental conditions.       
                                                          
14 Eligibility is determined based on their year of earning their bachelor’s degree in business and their current career 
standing.  Specifically, their graduation year must be before 1996 (i.e., have at least 15 years of professional 
experience) and they must either be university professors or hold or have held corporate positions in the C-suite or 
near the C-suite.  Among the respondents, only 8 indicated having no audit committee experience.  
15 The survey software ensured complete anonymity (i.e., no IP addresses were collected).  Hence, an analysis of the 
differences between the responses obtained from the two different recruitment methods could not be conducted.  
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Case Material and Procedures  
Participants were recruited via e-mail asking them to voluntarily participate in an online 
survey about the decision-making processes of audit committees.  The e-mails included a link to 
a website that directed the participants to one of the four experimental conditions.   
Once the participants click on the website link, they are thanked for their willingness to 
participate in the experiment, and asked to electronically sign an information consent form.  
Thereafter, the experiment begins by asking them to assume they are a member of an audit 
committee of a hypothetical manufacturing company and are preparing for an upcoming board 
meeting.   
The participants first read some background information about the hypothetical firm.  The 
background information includes a brief overview of the nature of the firm’s operations, a recent 
strategy change implemented by the new CEO, and information regarding the firm’s investor 
base (unsophisticated vs. sophisticated).  Participants in the greater disclosure condition are 
further alerted of a new regulation requiring additional commentary on significant accounting 
estimates in the audit report, while participants in the lower disclosure condition receive no such 
information.  After reading the background information about the firm, participants read a 
document developed by the external auditor regarding a significant accounting issue related to 
obsolete inventory that emerged during the audit process.  The document includes information 
about the nature of the accounting issue, the initial and revised (more favorable) amount 
estimated by the management to be most appropriate, and the auditor’s assessment of 
management’s final estimate.  The document is followed by an income statement and balance 
sheet that reflects the initial and revised estimate.  Finally, participants in the greater disclosure 
conditions receive an audit report that includes commentary about the accounting estimate as 
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explanatory paragraphs at the end of the report.  Participants in the lower disclosure condition 
receive a standard audit report with no additional commentary.  Such operationalization of 
greater disclosure in the audit report is based on the long-form reporting model, which is one of 
the possible forms of the modified audit report being considered by the PCAOB.   
Although the actually implemented form of the audit report may differ from the one used in 
the dissertation, there is no theoretical reason to predict a different operational form of the report 
would result in a significantly different conceptual effect from what is documented in this 
dissertation.  In addition, the long-form reporting model is similar to how emphasis-of-matter is 
disclosed in current reports.  Hence, the use of a long-form reporting model allows the 
experimental findings to have implications with respect to possible effects that emphasis-of-
matter disclosures under the current reporting model may have.  Appendix B presents the 
additional commentary on the management’s estimate provided in the greater disclosure 
conditions.      
After reviewing the background information, auditors’ communication, and the financial 
statements, the participants complete questionnaires related to the significant accounting issue.  I 
specifically ask several questions related to their comfort level on the final estimate as well as the 
degree to which they would like to question about the issue.  Participants are then further asked 
to develop, to the degree they feel appropriate, one or more questions they would like to ask the 
external auditors and/or management regarding the significant accounting issue.  The experiment 
concludes by asking several debriefing and demographic questionnaires.  The summary of the 
experimental procedure is shown in Figure 2.    
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VI. RESULTS 
Participants 
A total of 81 participants completed the online experiment.16  On average, they have 7.4 
years of audit committee experience (min=0; max=25), with no significant difference across the 
four different experimental conditions.17 Approximately half (52.1%) of the participants who 
have audit committee experience, reported to be designated financial experts.   
On average, participants’ self-reported level of engagement in asking questions in prior audit 
committee meetings is somewhat high with a mean of 1.33 (p < 0.01)on a scale of -3 (extremely 
low) to +3 (extremely high), with no significant difference across conditions.  Further, as Table 2 
shows, the mean (median) values for participants’ relative knowledge on financial accounting, 
financial statement analysis, auditing, audit committee best practice, and industry used in the 
case materials are 80.8% (82.7%), 81.7% (85.0%), 79.2% (82.7%), 77.5% (81.3%), and 50.7% 
(50.0%), respectively, with no significant difference across conditions.  There were no 
statistically significant differences between those who are designated as financial experts and 
those who are not so designated, except for the relative knowledge on audit committee best 
practices where experts reported to have significantly greater knowledge (84.1% vs. 71.8%, p < 
0.01, one-tailed).   
Participants who are designated financial experts also appeared to have significantly greater 
audit committee experience in general (9.53 vs. 4.14, t (79) = 4.20, p < 0.01, one-tailed), as well as 
                                                          
16 Meaningful response rates could not be obtained because the number of participants recruited via professional 
networks was unknown to the researcher.  
17 There were 8 participants who reported to have no experience serving on audit committees but met qualifications 
to serve as audit committee members.  The analysis result excluding this 8 participants are not significantly different 
from the results including all 81 participants.  Hence, I include all 81 participants in my analysis. 
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public company audit committee experience (2.03 vs. 0.67, t (79) = 3.16, p < 0.01, one-tailed) 
compared to those who are not designated financial experts.  However, the two groups did not 
differ at a statistically significant level with respect to their experience in serving on audit 
committees of not-for-profit (p = 0.19) or private organizations (p = 0.22).   
Manipulation Checks  
To assess the effectiveness of my investor type manipulation, I ask participants to indicate 
the extent they would characterize the hypothetical firm’s investor base to be sophisticated and 
their perception regarding the investors’ level of expertise.  I then develop a new variable of 
perceived investor sophistication based on a factor analysis conducted on the reported 
sophistication and expertise of the investor base.  Results indicate the perceived investor 
sophistication is significantly higher (1.56 vs. -1.77) in the higher sophistication conditions (t (79) 
= 15.4, p < 0.01, one-tailed).18   
I also ask the participants to indicate the extent to which they would characterize the 
hypothetical firm’s investor base to be vulnerable to examine if the manipulation of investor type 
had an effect on participants’ perceived investor vulnerability.  Results show that participants in 
the lower sophistication conditions perceived the investors to be significantly more vulnerable 
(1.41 vs. 0.86, t (79) = 2.07, p = 0.02, one-tailed). 19   Overall, the results suggest that the 
manipulation of investor type significantly affected the participants’ perception regarding the 
sophistication level and vulnerability of the hypothetical firm’s investor base.     
                                                          
18 The numerical values on the response scale were labeled as follows: -3 “extremely unsophisticated,” -2 
“unsophisticated,” -1 “somewhat unsophisticated,” 0 “neutral,” 1 “somewhat sophisticated,” 2 “sophisticated,” and 3 
“extremely sophisticated.”  
19 The numerical values on the response scale were labeled as follows: -3 “extremely not vulnerable,” -2 “not 
vulnerable,” -1 “somewhat not vulnerable,” 0 “neutral,” 1 “somewhat vulnerable,” 2 “vulnerable,” and 3 “extremely 
vulnerable.” 
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I examine the manipulation effectiveness of audit report content by asking participants to 
indicate the extent to which they believe the audit report issued for the hypothetical firm would 
alert the financial statement users of the significant accounting issue.  Results indicate that 
participants believed the audit report alerted the financial users to a greater extent (0.09 vs. -1.5) 
in the greater disclosure conditions (t (79) = 4.45, p < 0.01, one-tailed).20    
I also find evidence that the orthogonality of these manipulated two independent factors 
perceptually persisted in the minds of the participants as there is no significant effect of investor 
type on the participants’ perception regarding the likelihood that the audit report would alert the 
investors of the estimate (p = 0.60, two-tailed) as well as no significant effect of the content of 
the audit report on perceived investor sophistication (p = 0.47, two-tailed).  Further, there is no 
significant interaction between audit report content and investor type on the perceived likelihood 
that the audit report would alert investors of the significant estimate (p = 0.51, two-tailed) and 
perceived investor sophistication (p = 0.35, two-tailed).     
Test of Hypotheses 
Total Number of Questions 
Drawing on two different perspectives of accountability, H1a and H1b predict alternative 
ways that audit report content and investor type interactively will affect the audit committee 
members’ propensity to challenge management’s accounting estimates.  
Panel A of Table 3 tabulates the average and standard deviation of the number of questions 
participants developed by experimental conditions, and Panel B of Table 3 presents the analysis 
                                                          
20 The numerical values on the response scale were labeled as follows: -3 “extremely low,” -2 “low,” -1 “somewhat 
low,” 0 “neutral,” 1 “somewhat high,” 2 “high,” and 3 “extremely high.” 
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of variance (ANOVA).21  Panel C of Figure 1 also presents the observed pattern of results.  The 
findings primarily support the prediction based on the self-serving perspective (H1a).  
Specifically, audit committee members show greater questioning when the primary shareholders 
are sophisticated (mean = 6.08), as opposed to unsophisticated (mean = 3.00).  Moreover, when 
there is greater disclosure about management’s estimates in the audit report, audit committee 
members’ level of questioning decreases more given sophisticated, as opposed to unsophisticated, 
investors.   
As I predict an ordinal interaction (i.e., a nonsymmetric pattern of cell means) of audit report 
content and investor type on audit committee members’ propensity to challenge management’s 
estimates, I use contrast codes to test H1a.  Such analysis allows me to obtain greater statistical 
power in examining interactions compared to the conventional ANOVA tests (Buckless and 
Ravenscroft, 1990).  Panel C of Table 3 presents the results of the planned contrast tests as well 
as follow-up simple effect tests.  Consistent with my prediction, I apply contrast weights as 
follows: +3 in the lower disclosure/higher sophistication condition, +1 in the lower 
disclosure/lower sophistication condition, and -2 in the higher disclosure conditions.   
Results presented in Panel C show that the +3, +1, -2, -2 planned contrast is statistically 
significant (F = 20.54, p < 0.01, one-tailed), consistent with the predicted interaction as per the 
self-serving perspective of accountability.  In addition, the results of the follow-up simple effect 
                                                          
21 As individual audit committee members’ propensity to support auditors vs. support management, may influence 
the extent to which they engage in active questioning behavior, I examine if my findings hold while controlling for 
such propensity to support auditors.  The propensity to support auditors is measured by asking participants to 
indicate the amount of change in audit fees they would support when the auditor is insisting on a 5% increase in 
audit fees, while management is arguing for a 5% decrease.  On average, participants reported they would support a 
1.13% increase in audit fees, which is significantly greater than 0 (p < 0.01, one-tailed).  ANCOVA results (not 
reported) using this response as the covariate shows no significant effect of auditors’ propensity to support auditors 
(p = 0.13, two-tailed) on the degree to which audit committee members challenge management’s estimate.   
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tests show that when there is no additional information on management’s estimates in the audit 
report, there is a significant effect of investor type (F = 27.35, p < 0.01, one-tailed).  The results 
also show that the level of disclosure provided in the audit report significantly influences audit 
committee members’ propensity to challenge management’s estimates given sophisticated 
investors (F = 20.05, p < 0.01, one-tailed), while having no significant influence given 
unsophisticated investors (F = 0.06, p = 0.41, one-tailed).    For completeness, I also confirm that 
there is no statistically significant effect of investor type given greater disclosure in the audit 
report (F = 0.47, p = 0.50, two-tailed).  Overall, the results based on the total number of 
questions asked by the participants show support for H1a rather than H1b.  Specifically, audit 
report content and investor type jointly affect audit committee members’ propensity to engage in 
questioning behavior in a manner consistent with the prediction based on the self-serving 
perspective (see Panel A of Figure 1).  
Number of Probing Questions 
It is possible, however, that the participants in the low disclosure/high sophistication 
condition were simply asking greater number of questions that are not necessarily probing in 
nature.  Hence, I conduct qualitative analysis of the questions and re-test my hypotheses based 
on the number of probing questions rather than the total number of questions.  There is no 
conclusive list of probing questions audit committee members should ask.  Hence the coding 
scheme is developed based on audit committee best practices set out by the National Association 
of Corporate Directors (NACD), Center for Audit Quality (CAQ), and The Audit Committee 
Handbook.  Specifically, probing questions are questions that are difficult to answer by 
challenging the respondent to justify the decision; or questions that directly probe into the 
process of resolving the decision.  Therefore, if by answering the question, the question recipient 
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would have to justify the inventory valuation decision, provide important additional information 
about the decision or disclose how the accounting treatment was agreed upon, then the question 
is considered probing.  The full coding scheme is shown in Appendix B.        
        The coding was performed independently by two manager-level auditors of two different 
Big 4 firms who were blind to the experimental conditions.  The coders were asked to evaluate 
the list of questions for every participant to determine whether or not each question was probing 
in nature (i.e., binary coding with 1 = probing, 0 = not probing).  The coders obtained an 
agreement of 89.6%.  Any disagreements were resolved through a conference call where both 
coders and I were present. 
 Panel A of Table 4 tabulates the average and standard deviation of the number of probing 
questions participants developed by experimental conditions, and Panel B of Table 4 presents the 
analysis of variance (ANOVA).  Panel D of Figure 1 also presents the observed pattern of results.  
The findings confirm the results based on the total number of questions, further supporting the 
prediction based on the self-serving perspective (H1a).  Specifically, audit committee members 
show greater questioning when the primary shareholders are sophisticated (mean = 3.74), as 
opposed to unsophisticated (mean = 2.11).  Moreover, when there is greater disclosure about 
management’s estimates in the audit report, audit committee members’ level of questioning 
decreases more given sophisticated, as opposed to unsophisticated, investors.  The planned 
contrast shown in Panel C is also statistically significant (F = 10.76, p < 0.01, one-tailed), 
consistent with the analysis results based on the total number of questions asked.   
Overall, the results based on both the quantitative number of questions and their qualitative 
nature show support for the predictions based on the self-serving perspective of accountability.  
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Such findings suggest that perceived accountability risk, rather than the internal sense of 
responsibility is the underlying mechanism of audit committee’s questioning behavior.  
Secondary Measures of Audit Committee’s Propensity to Challenge Management’s Estimate 
One secondary measure of audit committee members’ propensity to question management’s 
estimate is the participants’ preferred extent of questioning regarding the appropriateness of the 
write-down amount.  Panel A of Table 5 summarizes the analysis results based on this measure 
and Panel A of Figure 5 graphically illustrates the observed effects.  Results show that audit 
report content has a marginally significant effect (p = 0.08) on the extent to which the 
participants would like to question the appropriateness of the write-down amount.  Specifically, 
greater disclosure in the audit report appears to lower their preferred extent of questioning the 
accounting issue.  This is consistent with the findings of the main analysis using the level and 
nature of the questions developed by the participants.  However, there is no significant effect of 
investor type (p =0.12) or a joint effect of audit report content and investor type (p=0.66).  Such 
findings may be due to low deviation (sd = 0.86) among participants’ responses, with most of the 
participants indicating that they would prefer moderately more than average amount of 
questioning on the accounting issue (mean = 2.40). 22  In other words, merely asking the 
participants the extent to which they would like to question may have triggered participants to 
answer at the higher-end of the response scale regardless of their experimental condition.23   
                                                          
22 The numerical values on the response scale were labeled as follows: -3 “significantly less than average amount of 
questioning would be warranted,” -2 “moderately less than average amount of questioning would be warranted,” -1 
“slightly less than average amount of questioning would be warranted,” 0 “average amount of questioning would be 
warranted,” 1 “slightly more than average amount of questioning would be warranted,” 2 “moderately more than 
average amount of questioning would be warranted,” and 3 “significantly more than average amount of questioning 
would be warranted.” 
23 When comparing those who are designated as financial experts and those who are not so designated, the experts 
preferred a greater extent of questioning (2.50 vs. 2.31), but not at a statistically significant level (p = 0.17).  
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Another secondary measure of audit committee’s propensity to question management’s 
estimate is their likelihood of asking questions on behalf of financial statement users on six 
different issues related to the inventory write-down.  The six issues include 1) auditor’s 
procedures to validate management’s write-off, 2) instructions given to the physical inspection 
team, 3) whether the auditor attempted to independently assess the amount of obsolete inventory, 
4) whether the company would be able to continue as a going concern if the old inventory turns 
out to be unsellable, 5) management’s reasoning on why they believe the cost of obsolete 
inventory can be recovered and 6) the extent to which auditors and management believe the new 
estimate is more reasonable compared to the initial estimate.  To examine whether and to what 
extent audit report content and investor type interactively influence audit committee members’ 
likelihood to ask questions on behalf of investors on these issues, I first conduct a factor analysis 
on the participants’ responses on the six different issues.  I then form a new variable, Likelihood 
of Questioning, based on the factor analysis results.  The analysis of variance results using this 
new variable are summarized in Panel B of Table 5.  Panel B of Figure 5 graphically illustrates 
the observed effects.  Consistent with the main analysis based on the level and nature of 
questions developed by the participants, greater investor sophistication leads audit committee 
members to indicate greater likelihood of questioning on behalf of investors (p = 0.06).  
Similarly, greater disclosure in the audit report leads to a lower likelihood of questioning on 
behalf of investors (p = 0.05).  However, there is no significant interaction between the two 
variables (p = 0.80).  Similar to the reasoning given for the analysis results based on the 
participants’ preferred extent of questioning, this may be due to the fact that directly asking 
participants to indicate their likelihood of questioning on behalf of financial statement users 
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triggered them to answer at the higher-end of the response scale (overall mean = 2.13) regardless 
of their experimental conditions.24   
Overall, the analysis results of the secondary measures of audit committee’s propensity to 
engage in questioning behavior are directionally consistent with the findings based on the level 
and nature of questions developed by the participants (i.e., primary measure of audit committee’s 
propensity to question management’s estimates).  Such findings support the argument that 
perceived accountability risk, rather than the internal sense of responsibility is the underlying 
mechanism of audit committee’s questioning behavior.  
  
                                                          
24 The numerical values on the response scale were labeled as follows: -3 “extremely unlikely,” -2 “unlikely,” -1 
“somewhat unlikely,” 0 “neutral,” 1 “somewhat likely,” 2 “likely,” and 3 “extremely likely.” 
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VII. SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES 
Further Evidence in Support of the Self-Serving Perspective of Accountability 
The main findings of the dissertation are consistent with the prediction based on the self-
serving perspective rather than the altruistic perspective of accountability.  This suggests that 
protection of self-interest, rather than altruism, underlies audit committee members’ perceived 
accountability in their decision-making processes.  This further implies that the results are likely 
to be stronger for audit committee members who perceive greater accountability risk.  The mere 
designation as an audit committee financial expert does not necessarily impose a higher legal 
degree of individual responsibility or obligation on a member of the audit committee (SOX 
Section 407).  However, being designated to such position is likely to increase one’s perceived 
accountability risk (Paskell-Mede and Jackson 1999; Rupley et al., 2011; Vera-Munoz, 2005; 
Zacharias 2000).25  At the same time, there is no reason to think experts are more altruistic.  If 
this is true, the results are likely to be stronger for participants who are designated financial 
experts.  I conduct a supplemental analysis to test such prediction.26    
Table 6 and 7 summarize the analysis based on the total number of questions and the number 
of probing questions, respectively.  On both tables, Panel A tabulates the descriptive statistics 
                                                          
25 Many of the comment letters to the SEC regarding the rule on financial experts proposed under Section 407 of 
SOX expressed concern that such rule would increase the perceived liability of audit committee members, 
decreasing their willingness to serve as financial experts or to serve as audit committee members at all.  See 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74002.shtml for the full list of comment letters.   
26 Among the participants with audit committee experience (n = 73), those who are designated as financial experts (n 
= 38), compared to those who are not so designated (n = 35), have significantly greater amount of audit committee 
experience (9.53 years vs. 5.10 years, t = 3.24, p < 0.01, one-tailed) and have served on significantly greater number 
of public company audit committees (2.03 vs. 0.83, t = 2.54, p < 0.01, one-tailed).   
36 
 
and Panel B presents the analysis of variance (ANOVA), while Panel C primarily tests my 
prediction. 27   The observed pattern of the results by groups is shown in Figure 3 and 4.   
Results suggest the findings documented in the previous section are mainly driven by 
participants who are designated as financial experts.  Specifically, the +3, +1, -2, -2 planned 
contrast using the total number of questions is statistically significant (F = 21.39, p < 0.01, one-
tailed) for designated financial experts while it is not significant (F = 0.93, p = 0.17, one-tailed) 
for non-financial experts.  In addition, the results of the follow-up simple effect tests for 
designated financial experts show that when there is no additional information in the audit report, 
there is a significant effect of investor type (F = 32.95, p < 0.01, one-tailed).  The results also 
show that the level of disclosure provided in the audit report significantly influences the 
propensity to challenge management’s estimates given sophisticated investors (F = 26.98, p < 
0.01, one-tailed), while having no significant effect given unsophisticated investors (F = 0.04, p 
= 0.42, one-tailed).  I also confirm that there is no statistically significant effect of investor type 
given greater disclosure in the audit report for designated financial experts (F = 0.04, p = 0.85, 
two-tailed).  The +3, +1, -2, -2 planned contrast using the number of probing questions is also 
statistically significant (F = 14.85, p < 0.01, one-tailed) for designated financial experts while it 
is not significant (F = 0.76, p = 0.19, one-tailed) for non-financial experts.   
Such findings provide further evidence in support of the prediction based on the self-serving 
perspective, suggesting that protection of self-interest, rather than altruism, is the accountability 
                                                          
27 As participants were randomly assigned, I was not able to control for the number of designated financial experts 
assigned to the different experimental conditions.  As a consequence, the four conditions have an unbalanced 
number of designated financial experts.  Some statisticians recommend using Type II sums of squares in such 
situations as opposed to the conventional Type III sums of squares (e.g., Maxwell and Delaney, 1990).  As it turns 
out, the interaction of investor type and disclosure is statistically significant whether I use the Type III (p < 0.01) or 
Type II (p < 0.01) sums of squares.  
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mechanism underlying audit committee members’ decision processes.  Moreover, the findings 
suggest that despite their greater capacity to ask challenging questions, designated financial 
experts will challenge auditors and/or management to a greater extent only when they perceive a 
strong cognitive need to do so (e.g., when the primary shareholders are sophisticated and no 
additional disclosure in the audit report is required).  
Mediation Effect of Perceived Comfort on Financial Experts 
The results thus far imply that audit committee members’ incentive to minimize potential 
accountability risk drives their decision making process.  Perceived accountability risk is likely 
to be negatively associated with audit committee members’ comfort level regarding the 
accounting issue at hand.  Greater accountability risk, thus, will lower audit committee members’ 
comfort level.  This, in turn, will likely increase their need to obtain justification about the issue, 
raising their propensity to question about it.  Hence, I conduct a mediation analysis using the 
participants’ comfort level regarding the accounting decision to gain further understanding on 
how audit committee members’ perceived accountability risk affects their behaviors.   
I first develop a variable of audit committee’s overall comfort regarding the accounting issue 
based on a factor analysis on the participants’ perceived comfort regarding 1) management’s 
change in estimate, 2) auditor’s decision to allow management’s updated, smaller write-down of 
inventory, and 3) the difference in the net income that results from the different write-down 
amounts.  Using this new variable, I conduct a mediation analysis according to the four-step 
procedure specified by Baron and Kenny (1986) on how the content of the audit report affects 
the number of probing questions asked by the participants.28  The analysis is only conducted on 
                                                          
28 Mediation analysis using the total number of questions as the dependent variable is not significantly different from 
the results based on the number of probing questions.   
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the responses provided by designated financial experts given sophisticated investors as these are 
the conditions that drive my overall findings.29  Figure 6 summarizes the results of the analysis.   
Consistent with my main findings, step 1 indicates higher disclosure in the audit report 
negatively affects participants’ propensity to challenge management’s estimates (p < 0.01, one-
tailed).  Step 2 indicates that higher disclosure positively affects participants’ perceived level of 
comfort regarding the accounting decision (p = 0.04, one-tailed).  Step 3 shows that the 
perceived comfort level about the accounting decision negatively impacts the participants’ 
propensity to challenge management’s estimate (p = 0.04, one-tailed).  Finally, step 4 indicates 
that participants’ comfort with respect to the accounting decision fully mediates the influence of 
the disclosure level of the audit report on their propensity to challenge management’s accounting 
estimate (p = 0.17, two-tailed).  Such results imply that greater disclosure in the audit report on 
management’s significant accounting estimate increases audit committee members’ overall 
comfort level regarding the issue (i.e., decreasing perceived accountability risk), ultimately 
leading to a decrease in their propensity to engage in questioning behavior.   
Audit Committee Members’ Self-Insight into Decision Processes  
I conduct additional analysis to gain further insight on audit committee members’ self-insight 
regarding the effect of the content of the audit report and investor type on their decision 
processes.  After completing the main case questionnaires, I ask participants to indicate the 
extent to which they believe 1) an increase in investor sophistication and 2) increased disclosure 
in the audit report, would affect the degree to which they would like the auditors and/or 
                                                          
29 When comparing the perceived comfort level between designated financial experts and those who are not so 
designated, financial experts appear to perceive a greater level of comfort (-1.20 vs. -3.55) at a statistically 
significant level (p = 0 < 0.01, one-tailed).  
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management to be questioned.  The response scale ranged from -3 to +3, where -3 was labeled as 
‘substantially decrease questioning’ and +3 as ‘substantially increase questioning.’   
I find that, on average, participants believe they will increase their level of questioning both 
when the sophistication level of the investor base increases (mean = 0.12, p = 0.02, one-tailed) 
and when there is greater disclosure in the audit report (mean = 1.24, p < 0.01, one-tailed).30  
Recall that the results from main case questionnaires show that audit committee members 
challenge management’s estimates to a greater extent when the primary shareholders are 
sophisticated investors and/or when the audit report does not have any additional disclosures 
about the significant accounting estimate.   
Together, these findings suggest that while participants have some level of self-insight with 
respect to how different investor type may affect their behaviors, they are not aware and 
probably misguided of how their behaviors may be influenced under different levels of 
disclosures in the audit report.  Accordingly, while audit committee members, along with 
standard setters, may believe that greater disclosure in the audit report may increase audit 
committee members’ propensity to question management and/or auditors, actual implementation 
of such requirement may have unintended consequences by actually lowering their level of 
questioning.  This also suggests that surveys that simply ask what audit committee members 
think they will do if changes were made to the audit environment may result in misleading (even 
if well-intended) responses.  
  
                                                          
30 Designated financial experts, compared to those who are not so designated, do not possess significantly better 
self-insight with respect to the effect of greater investor sophistication (mean = 0.12 vs. 0.13; p = 0.45, one-tailed) 
and greater disclosure in the audit report (mean = 1.14 vs. 1.33; p = 0.24, one-tailed) on their questioning level.  
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VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This dissertation investigates the determinants of audit committee members’ propensity to 
challenge management’s significant accounting estimates.  Specifically, I provide theory and 
empirical evidence on how audit report content and investor type jointly affect audit committee 
members’ degree of questioning while overseeing the financial reporting and auditing processes.  
Overall, the findings suggest that audit committee members challenge management’s 
estimate to the greatest extent when the firm’s primary shareholders are sophisticated and there is 
no additional disclosure in the audit report related to the significant accounting estimate.  There 
is also evidence of audit committee members significantly decreasing their level of questioning 
when the primary shareholders are unsophisticated and/or when there is greater disclosure in the 
audit report related to the significant accounting estimate.  Such findings are consistent with the 
predictions based on the self-serving perspective of accountability, implying that perceived 
accountability triggered by the motivation to protect self-interest, rather than an internal sense of 
responsibility to protect shareholders, is what causally drives the judgment and decision-making 
process of audit committee members.  Supplemental analysis provides further evidence in 
support of the self-serving perspective by showing that the results tend to be more pronounced 
for audit committee members who are designated as financial experts.             
There are various ways future research can extend the findings of this dissertation.  First, this 
dissertation focuses on how the piecemeal implementation of greater disclosure in the audit 
report, the current approach being considered by standard setters, would affect audit committee 
members.  In other words, the effect of changes in the audit report as part of a portfolio of other 
policies, such as those suggested by Peecher et al. (2011) that would switch auditors’ 
accountability from penalties for bad outcomes towards rewards for good judgment processes, is 
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not considered.  Future research can examine whether the findings documented in this 
dissertation are moderated or flipped with the implementation of such portfolio of changes in the 
audit environment.  Second, future research can extend this dissertation by examining how 
greater disclosure in the audit report affects other members of the financial reporting supply 
chain, such as auditors and firm management, and how their behavior, in turn, may affect audit 
committee members’ oversight process.  For example, there may be changes in management’s 
forthcomingness when greater disclosure is required in the audit report.  Such change, in turn, 
may affect audit committee members’ propensity to challenge management’s estimates.  The 
reaction of financial statement users may also be of interest as they are the ones who are insisting 
on such change.  Third, future research can examine the effects of different composition of 
investor type.  As one example, the presence of one big institutional investor where the primary 
shareholders are unsophisticated may alter the findings documented in this dissertation.  Fourth, 
future research could address the issue of possible group dynamics among several audit 
committee members by using interacting groups to assess whether the implications of my 
findings extend in a group setting.    
Overall, the theory and findings of the dissertation extensively enhances our understanding 
regarding audit committee members’ decision-making processes.  I also address the call for 
behavioral research on audit committees (Carcello et al., 2011) and provide ex ante evidence of 
possible ‘policy resistance’31 to greater disclosure in the audit report in terms of decreased audit 
committee effectiveness.  Such findings warrant careful consideration of ways to minimize such 
unintended consequences before implementing a new auditor’s reporting model.  Moreover, the 
                                                          
31 Policy resistance is defined as “the tendency for interventions to be defeated by the response of the system to the 
intervention itself” and is used in the systems dynamics literature to refer to the occurrence of unintended 
consequences of well-intended efforts to solve pressing problems (Sterman, 2002). 
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findings are also applicable in the current audit environment, as I examine the effect of greater 
disclosure in the audit report using a form that is similar to emphasis-of-matter disclosures under 
the current reporting model.  I also add to the expertise and corporate governance literatures by 
demonstrating that while designated financial experts have a greater capacity to challenge 
management’s estimates, a potentially troubling boundary condition is an unsophisticated 
investor base.    
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APPENDIX A 
Predictive Validity Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investor base consisting largely of 
unsophisticated vs. sophisticated 
investors 
Presence vs. absence of explanatory 
paragraphs on management’s 
accounting estimate in the audit 
report 
 
Number of probing questions 
asked by audit committee 
members 
 
Investor type 
 
Audit committee’s propensity to 
question management’s significant 
accounting estimates 
Content of audit report 
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APPENDIX B 
Coding Scheme for Qualitative Analysis 
Please code the questions in terms of 1) who the question was directed to and 2) whether the 
question is probing or not based on the coding scheme described below. (Note: I do not make any 
predictions with respect to who the target of the questions will be. This is simply to obtain insight 
on the proportion of questions directed to management vs. auditors) 
 
1. Who is the question directed to?  
a. (0) none 
b. (1) management (CFO/COO/CEO) 
c. (2) auditor 
d. (3) both   
 
2. Is the question probing?  
a. (0) No 
b. (1) Yes 
 
• To be considered probing, questions must be directly related to the inventory valuation 
decision and must challenge the auditor and/or CFO to justify the decision.  
 
Specifically, probing questions are questions that are difficult to answer by 
challenging the respondent to justify the decision; or questions that directly probe into 
the process of resolving the decision. Therefore, if by answering the question, the 
question recipient would have to justify the inventory valuation decision, provide 
important additional information about the decision or disclose how the accounting 
treatment was agreed upon, then the question is considered probing.  
 
o Any question that asks about the appropriateness of the accounting treatment is 
considered challenging or probing.  
 Ex: Justify the difference between the two estimates.  
 Ex: How confident are the auditors about management’s estimates? 
 Ex: What is the fair value of this inventory? 
 Ex: If given a choice, what method would you choose to value the inventory? 
 Ex: How would regulatory bodies view manipulation of this kind?  
 
o Any question that asks about the internal or external influences or pressures that 
could affect the estimate is considered challenging or probing.  
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 Ex: Does the new estimate affect the company’s ability to be in compliance 
with debt covenants?  
 Ex: What are the implications for going concern?  
 Ex: Does the new estimate affect management’s compensation in any way?  
 
o Any question that asks about disagreements between the management and 
auditors is considered challenging or probing. 
 Ex: Were there any disagreements with the management on the estimate, and 
if so, how did they respond to your disagreement?  
 
o Note: The list above is not conclusive.  Any other question that challenges the 
respondent to justify the inventory valuation or provide important additional 
information about the decision or disclose how the accounting treatment was 
agreed upon is considered probing. 
 
o Non-probing questions: does not challenge the respondent to provide information 
or justification about how the issue was resolved with the other party. 
 Ex: How much additional investment does the company need to spend in 
order to make those products related to the old strategy to be sold?  
 Ex: What does the company plan to do with obsolete inventory? – business 
strategy question that is not directly related to the accounting decision. 
 Are there any accounts receivables outstanding related to sales of the old 
strategy inventory?   
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APPENDIX C 
Commentary Added in the Audit Report of the Greater Disclosure Conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Justification of Assessments  
In accordance with the professional standards applicable in the Unites States, we bring to your 
attention the following matters:  
SCA’s management adjusted its inventory by writing it down to its estimated net realizable 
value.  This write down was necessary when a portion of its inventory became unsalable after 
implementation of a new marketing strategy as described in note 3.2 to the consolidated 
financial statements.  The portion of on-hand inventory that management estimated to be 
unsalable had a carrying value of $970,000, and so management took a write down of 
inventory in this amount, materially decreasing SCA’s net income.  
As part of our audit of significant accounting estimates, we assessed the assumptions made 
and the approach taken by management regarding this estimate for compliance, in all material 
respects, with U.S. GAAP.  In addition, we communicated this issue to the audit committee in 
accordance with PCAOB Auditing Standards (AU 380).  These procedures were performed in 
the context of our audit of the consolidated financial statements as a whole, and therefore 
contributed to the opinion expressed above. 
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Experimental Materials 
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Welcome! 
Thank you for volunteering to participate in this survey. 
Please proceed to the next page to begin. 
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Informed Consent Form       
This research is being conducted by doctoral student Yoon Ju Kang under the supervision of 
Dr. Mark Peecher (Professor of Accountancy at the University of Illinois).  The purpose of 
this research is to investigate how audit committee members make judgments and 
decisions.  The experimental task involves reading about a hypothetical public company and 
answering several questions related to it. The benefits of this experiment primarily relate to 
enhancing our understanding of how audit committee members make judgments and 
decisions. 
You must be 18 years old or older to participate in the study.  Your participation is completely 
voluntary and you may discontinue your participation at any time. Neither the firm nor the 
investigator will penalize you if you choose not to participate.  The task is expected to take 
approximately 15 to 25 minutes. Your participation in this study will not expose you to any 
form of risk (physical or otherwise) beyond that normally encountered in daily 
life.  Responses will be assigned a participant number, so that data files will not contain any 
identification of the names of individual participants or their firm affiliation. Your 
confidentiality and that of your firm is assured. Results of this experiment may be 
disseminated in academic workshops, conferences, and/or in academic journals at aggregated 
levels. 
Should you have any questions about the study you may contact Dr. Peecher at (217) 333-
4542 or peecher@illinois.edu via e-mail. If you have any questions about your rights as a 
participant in this study or any concerns or complaints, please contact the University of 
Illinois Institutional Review Board at 217-333-2670 (collect calls will be accepted if you 
identify yourself as a research participant) or via email at irb@illinois.edu.      
Please click the button below to indicate that you have read and understand the above consent 
form and voluntarily agree to participate in the study.  Thank you.    
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While completing the case materials, please assume you are an audit committee 
member for a hypothetical firm to be described.   
You will now be provided with information regarding the hypothetical firm.  The 
information provided in the case may be considerably less than what you 
normally would have as an audit committee member.  Nevertheless, your best 
professional judgments given the available information would be 
appreciated.  Please read the case information carefully and respond to the 
questions that follow.  You may ignore any tax effects.    
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Background  
Founded in 1985, Simple Computer Accessories (SCA) is a public company traded on the 
NASDAQ.  Today, you are attending a meeting of SCA’s Board of Directors to review and 
discuss the annual financial statements.  As you prepare for your meeting, you study the 
information you have gathered to date.  
 
Change in Regulation (Only in Higher Disclosure Condition) 
One thing that catches your attention is a new standard about the auditor’s report.  In addition to 
the current unqualified/qualified (pass/fail) opinion on the financial statements, the new standard 
requires a justification of auditor’s assessments section.  In this new section of the auditor’s 
report, auditors must disclose their assessment of significant accounting estimates made by 
management. Regulators say the new standard is intended to provide more informative 
disclosure to investors and other financial statement users.  As a result of the new standard, the 
auditor will later provide commentary on the significant accounting estimates that you will be 
discussing in the meeting you are about to attend.  Again, this commentary will appear directly in 
the auditor’s report via additional explanatory paragraph(s) after the audit opinion.   
 
Overview of Company 
SCA began as a manufacturing company in 1985 located in Dayton, Ohio. It acquired sales 
contracts to fit specifications requested by local colleges to assemble computer desks, chairs, and 
accessories for dormitories and computer labs.  SCA also would distribute other products 
through numerous local computer stores, located on or near college campuses, for direct sale to 
students.  Its reputation for high-quality, durable products grew steadily over time and it located 
dozens of sales offices near college towns throughout the Midwest and Southeast regions of the 
United States.   
 
Performance and Strategy  
After several years of decreasing sales, SCA was in need of a turnaround.  In April 2010, SCA 
replaced its CEO.  The new CEO, Robert Smith, initiated a significantly different product-
marketing strategy, with a gradual phase-in during the second half of 2010.  Based on this new 
strategy, SCA began to shift away from directly contracting with colleges and towards 
substantially manufacturing computer desks and chairs as well as other furniture to fit the 
specifications demanded by two major retailers (e.g., Office Depot and IKEA).  SCA plans to 
close the majority of its direct sales offices and is no longer a distributor to numerous, smaller 
local retailers.  Despite the strategic change, sales failed to meet SCA’s projections, but perhaps 
it is too soon to tell whether the new strategy will work.   
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Investor Base  
(Lower Sophistication Condition) Approximately 85% of SCA’s outstanding common stock is 
held by unsophisticated, individual investors including retirees, current employees, and former 
employees.  As such, most of SCA’s investor base has neither access to nor expertise in 
analyzing information germane to SCA and its industry.  These investors are not able to conduct 
independent market research and are only novices at financial-statement analyses. They also lack 
investment information other than what is available to the general public (as in SCA annual 
reports).  Finally, these investors tend to be long-term, dedicated investors with high 
concentration in their holdings and low portfolio turnover.  The remaining 15% consists of a 
variety of other investors.  
 
(Higher Sophistication Condition) Approximately 85% of SCA’s outstanding common stock is 
held by sophisticated, institutional investors including pension funds, mutual funds, and private 
hedge funds.  As such, most of SCA’s investor base has considerable access to and expertise in 
analyzing information germane to SCA and its industry.  These investors can conduct 
independent market research and are experts at financial-statement analyses.  They possess 
investment information well beyond what is available to the general public (as in SCA annual 
reports).  Finally, these investors tend to be long-term, dedicated investors with high 
concentration in their holdings and low portfolio turnover.  The remaining 15% consists of a 
variety of other investors.
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Communications with SCA’s External Auditor 
In compliance with PCAOB Audit Standards (AU Sec. 380), the external auditor orally informed 
you and other audit committee members of significant accounting issues discussed with 
management as summarized below.   
 
2011 Audit Results - Significant Accounting Estimate  
 PCAOB Audit Standards (AU Section 380) requires us to communicate to the audit 
committee about significant accounting estimates that may have a material impact on the 
financial statements.  The following summarizes the significant accounting estimate discussed 
during our audit of SCA for the 2011 fiscal year.   
1. Description of the Significant Estimate: 
 There was a large increase in inventory from $5,510,000 at June 30, 2010 (audited) to 
$12,035,000 at June 30, 2011 (unaudited). The sales contracts for nearly all the inventory 
marketed under SCA’s old strategy have expired. So additional marketing costs would be 
necessary for the older inventory to be sold, and much of the inventory related to SCA’s previous 
strategy might now be unsalable or would require a substantial markdown in order to sell. Hence, 
we discussed with management a potential adjustment to write-down inventory to its estimated 
net realizable value. This write-down would decrease SCA’s assets and net income, and 
depending on its size, could have a material negative impact on SCA’s financial statements. 
2. Judgment made by SCA’s Management: 
 When we initially discussed the issue with SCA’s management several weeks ago, 
approximately 58 percent ($6,995,000) of the inventory was estimated to include products 
saleable under the new marketing strategy, while 42 percent ($5,040,000) was estimated to 
include products marketed under the old strategy with expired contracts.  Of the $5,040,000, 
management estimated $4,000,000 as the value to be reported as obsolete inventory with the 
$1,040,000 attributed to salvage value.  Financial statements incorporating this estimate are 
shown in column A of Table 1, which will be shown on the next page.   
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 (continued from previous page) 
 
As part of our audit process, we asked SCA to provide us with a report showing the 
breakdown of the slow-moving inventory. SCA’s accounting system could not track inventory in 
real-time, however, so we could not pull an aging analysis on slow-moving goods from the 
system. Although inventory is a material account on SCA’s balance sheet, management informed 
us that they would not be able to develop a new inventory system to track and value the existing 
inventory due to time constraints.  As a compensating control, the Vice President, COO, and 
CFO of SCA suggested non-sales personnel go conduct physical inspection of the inventory 
warehouses. This process led to a revised and considerably smaller estimate of $970,000 in 
obsolete inventory. The financial statements incorporating this revised estimate are shown in 
column B of Table 1.  
Because the revised write-down, at $970,000, is only 24.3% of the originally proposed 
write-down of $4,000,000, we questioned the CFO who stated that the high inventory level was 
due to SCA’s intense focus on the turn-around rather than selling old inventory. The CFO also 
stated that based upon the physical inspection and further analysis, once SCA starts marketing 
old products, they will sell for more than previously estimated.  The CFO also noted that an 
overly conservative write-down unrelated to the turn-around will send the wrong message to its 
investors: the turn-around is not working. We conducted additional market research as well 
before concluding that the new estimate is reasonable.  As such, the estimate does not require 
any modification to our proposed unqualified (clean) opinion. (Higher Disclosure Condition 
Only) However, our assessment of the estimate will be discussed in the justification section of 
the audit report.  
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Table 1 
Effects of Two Alternatives for Obsolete Inventory Write-Off 
on the Income Statement and Balance Sheet  
          
Income Statement for the Year Ending 6/30/2011 (Adjusted) 
(in thousands)         
Inventory Alternative   
(A) 
Initial Estimate   
(B) 
Revised Estimate 
Sales    $             23,685     $             23,685  
Cost of Sales    $           (17,316)    $           (17,316) 
Gross Margin    $               6,369     $               6,369  
Operating Expense    $             (1,054)    $             (1,054) 
Other Expense:          
   Write-down of inventory to market  $             (4,000)    $                (970) 
Net Income    $               1,315     $               4,345  
EPS   $2.15    $4.41  
    % increase in EPS       105.1% 
  
         
Select Balance Sheet Items 6/30/2011 (Adjusted)       
(in thousands)         
 
        
Assets         
Inventory    $             12,035     $             12,035  
                  Allowance to Reduce  
                   Inventory to Market    $               4,000     $                  970  
Net Inventory    $               8,035     $             11,065  
Current Ratio   3.41   4.67 
    % increase in Current Ratio     37.0% 
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New Requirement for Auditor’s Report (Higher Disclosure Condition) 
Recall that a new standard regarding audit reports has been implemented to provide more 
informative disclosure about auditors’ assessments of significant accounting estimates made by 
management.  As a result of the new standard, a summary of the commentary about the 
adjustment of inventory to its net realizable value will be disclosed in the auditor’s report via 
additional explanatory paragraphs after the audit opinion.  The expected audit report is shown 
below with the additional explanatory paragraphs that will be disclosed shown in the second half 
under "Justification of Assessments." 
 
Report of Independent Registered Accounting Firm 
Board of Directors and Shareholders                           
Simple Computer Accessories, Corp. 
We have audited the accompanying balance sheet of Simple Computer Accessories, Corp. (the 
“Company”) as of June 30, 2011 and the related statements of income, shareholders’ equity, and 
cash flows for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2011.   We also have audited the Company’s 
internal control over financial reporting as of June 30, 2011, based on the criteria established in 
Internal Control – Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations 
of the Treadway Commission (COSO). The Company’s management is responsible for these 
financial statements, for maintaining effective control over financial reporting, and for its 
assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting included in 
Management’s Report on Internal Controls over Financial Reporting. These financial statements 
are the responsibility of the Company's management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion 
on these financial statements based on our audit. 
We conducted our audit in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (United States). Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 
obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free from material 
misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and 
disclosures in the financial statements. An audit also includes assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the overall financial 
statement presentation. We believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.  
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(continued from previous page) 
A company’s internal control over financial reporting is a process designed by, or under the 
supervision of, the company’s principal executive and principal financial officers, or persons 
performing similar functions, and effected by the company’s board of directors, management, 
and other personnel to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial 
reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles. A company’s internal control over financial reporting 
includes those policies and procedures that (1) pertain to the maintenance of records that, in 
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of 
the company; (2) provide reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as necessary to 
permit preparation of financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles, and that receipts and expenditures of the company are being made only in accordance 
with authorizations of management and directors of the company; and (3) provide reasonable 
assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use, or 
disposition of the company’s assets that could have a material effect on the financial statements.  
 
Because of the inherent limitations of internal control over financial reporting, including the 
possibility of collusion or improper management override of controls, material misstatements 
due to error or fraud may not be prevented or detected on a timely basis. Also, projections of any 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the internal control over financial reporting to future periods 
are subject to the risk that the controls may become inadequate because of changes in conditions, 
or that the degree of compliance with the policies or procedures may deteriorate.  
 
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly, in all material respects, 
the financial position of the Company as of June 30, 2011, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for the fiscal year then ended in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP). Also, in our opinion, the Company maintained, in all material respects, 
effective internal control over financial reporting as of June 30, 2011, based on the criteria 
established in Internal Control—Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission. 
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(continued from previous page) 
Justification of Assessments  
In accordance with the professional standards applicable in the Unites States, we bring to your 
attention the following matters:  
SCA’s management adjusted its inventory by writing it down to its estimated net realizable 
value.  This write down was necessary when a portion of its inventory became unsalable after 
implementation of a new marketing strategy as described in note 3.2 to the consolidated financial 
statements.  The portion of on-hand inventory that management estimated to be unsalable had a 
carrying value of $970,000, and so management took a write down of inventory in this amount, 
materially decreasing SCA’s net income.  
As part of our audit of significant accounting estimates, we assessed the assumptions made and 
the approach taken by management regarding this estimate for compliance, in all material 
respects, with U.S. GAAP.  In addition, we communicated this issue to the audit committee in 
accordance with PCAOB Auditing Standards (AU 380).  These procedures were performed in 
the context of our audit of the consolidated financial statements as a whole, and therefore 
contributed to the opinion expressed above. 
August 31, 2011             
XYZ 
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Standard Auditor’s Report (Lower Disclosure Condition) 
As the external audit firm is prepared to give an unqualified (clean) audit opinion for this year’s 
financial statements, the following standard unqualified audit report is expected to be issued.  
 
Report of Independent Registered Accounting Firm 
Board of Directors and Shareholders                            
Simple Computer Accessories, Corp. 
We have audited the accompanying balance sheet of Simple Computer Accessories, Corp. (the 
“Company”) as of June 30, 2011 and the related statements of income, shareholders’ equity, and 
cash flows for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2011.   We also have audited the Company’s 
internal control over financial reporting as of June 30, 2011, based on the criteria established in 
Internal Control – Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations 
of the Treadway Commission (COSO). The Company’s management is responsible for these 
financial statements, for maintaining effective control over financial reporting, and for its 
assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting included in 
Management’s Report on Internal Controls over Financial Reporting. These financial statements 
are the responsibility of the Company's management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion 
on these financial statements based on our audit. 
We conducted our audit in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (United States). Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 
obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free from material 
misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and 
disclosures in the financial statements. An audit also includes assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the overall financial 
statement presentation. We believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.  
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A company’s internal control over financial reporting is a process designed by, or under the 
supervision of, the company’s principal executive and principal financial officers, or persons 
performing similar functions, and effected by the company’s board of directors, management, 
and other personnel to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial 
reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles. A company’s internal control over financial reporting 
includes those policies and procedures that (1) pertain to the maintenance of records that, in 
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of 
the company; (2) provide reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as necessary to 
permit preparation of financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles, and that receipts and expenditures of the company are being made only in accordance 
with authorizations of management and directors of the company; and (3) provide reasonable 
assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use, or 
disposition of the company’s assets that could have a material effect on the financial statements.  
 
Because of the inherent limitations of internal control over financial reporting, including the 
possibility of collusion or improper management override of controls, material misstatements 
due to error or fraud may not be prevented or detected on a timely basis. Also, projections of any 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the internal control over financial reporting to future periods 
are subject to the risk that the controls may become inadequate because of changes in conditions, 
or that the degree of compliance with the policies or procedures may deteriorate.  
 
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly, in all material respects, 
the financial position of the Company as of June 30, 2011, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for the fiscal year then ended in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP). Also, in our opinion, the Company maintained, in all material respects, 
effective internal control over financial reporting as of June 30, 2011, based on the criteria 
established in Internal Control—Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission. 
 
August 31, 2011                
XYZ 
 
 
 
 
 
  
67 
 
 
 
 
Please indicate the likelihood you believe the following statement is true:  
The write-down amount of obsolete inventory, based on the new estimate of $970,000, is too 
small (i.e., too aggressive) compared to the initial estimate of $4,000,000, and is causing a 
material overstatement of inventory.  
 
                 
 
 
Please indicate your comfort level regarding the following issues:  
a. The change in management’s estimate of obsolete inventory  
 
                 
 
b. Auditor’s decision to allow management’s updated, smaller write-down of inventory              
    
 
 
 
 
c. The difference in the net income that results from the different write-down amounts for 
obsolete inventory 
 
                 
 
  
Considering all the information you have reviewed related to SCA and its external 
auditor, please answer the following questions. (Note: The survey software necessitates 
the response scales to start at Neutral.) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
 
Extremely 
Likely 
 
| - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - |                   
-3             -2           -1                    0                      1           2                        3 
 Unlikely Neutral Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Likely 
Likely 
 
| - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - |                   
-3             -2           -1                    0                      1           2                        3 
 Completely 
Uncomfortable 
 
Completely 
 Comfortable 
 
Uncomfortable 
 
Somewhat 
Uncomfortable 
 
Neutral 
 
Somewhat 
Comfortable 
 
Comfortable 
 
| - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - |                   
-3             -2           -1                    0                      1           2                        3 
 
| - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - |                   
-3             -2           -1                    0                      1           2                        3 
 Completely 
Uncomfortable 
 
Completely 
 Comfortable 
 
Uncomfortable 
 
Somewhat 
Uncomfortable 
 
Neutral 
 
Somewhat 
Comfortable 
 
Comfortable 
 
Completely 
Uncomfortable 
 
Completely 
 Comfortable 
 
Uncomfortable 
 
Somewhat 
Uncomfortable 
 
Neutral 
 
Somewhat 
Comfortable 
 
Comfortable 
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To what extent would you like to question auditors and/or management about the 
appropriateness/sufficiency of the write-down amount?  (Note: To the extent that you feel 
worried about the write-down issue and want to question auditors and/or management, but are 
not sure what questions to ask, your answer should be on the higher-end of this scale).  
 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
Based upon the information presented, please write down any questions, in the order that they 
come to mind, you would ask of SCA’s CFO and/or the audit partner regarding the significant 
accounting estimate related to obsolete inventory valuation described above. 
Questions you would ask: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Significantly 
less than 
average 
amount of 
questioning 
would be 
warranted 
| - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - |                   
-3               -2         -1                    0                     1           2                       3 
  Moderately 
less than 
average 
amount of 
questioning 
would be 
warranted 
Slightly 
less than 
average 
amount of 
questioning 
would be 
warranted 
Average 
amount of 
questioning 
would be 
warranted 
Slightly 
more than 
average 
amount of 
questioning 
would be 
warranted 
Moderately 
more than 
average 
amount of 
questioning 
would be 
warranted 
Significantly 
more than 
average 
amount of 
questioning 
would be 
warranted 
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Please indicate the likelihood that you would ask, or have other audit committee members ask 
the following questions on behalf of SCA’s current investor base and other financial statement 
users.  
a. To the Auditor: What procedures did your team conduct to validate management’s write-off 
amount?  
 
 
                 
 
 
b. To the Management: What instructions did the physical inspection team receive, exactly?  
 
 
                 
 
 
 
c. To the Auditor: Did you attempt to independently assess the amount of obsolete inventory or 
did you simply use the information provided to you by SCA’s management?  
 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
d. To both the Auditor & Management: If the old inventory turns out to be unsellable, will the 
company be able to continue as a going concern?  
 
 
 
                 
| - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - |                   
-3             -2           -1                    0                      1           2                        3 
 
| - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - |                   
-3             -2         -1                    0                      1           2                        3 
 
| - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - |                   
-3             -2           -1                    0                      1           2                        3 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
 
Extremely 
 Likely 
 
Unlikely 
 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
 
Neutral 
 
Somewhat 
Likely 
 
Likely 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
 
Extremely 
 Likely 
 
Unlikely 
 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
 
Neutral 
 
Somewhat 
Likely 
 
Likely 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
 
Extremely 
 Likely 
 
Unlikely 
 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
 
Neutral 
 
Somewhat 
Likely 
 
Likely 
 
| - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - |                   
-3             -2           -1                    0                      1           2                        3 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
 
Extremely 
 Likely 
 
Unlikely 
 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
 
Neutral 
 
Somewhat 
Likely 
 
Likely 
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e. To the Management: The write-off of $970,000 leaves substantial amount of inventory still 
on the books. Why do you think the cost of this inventory can be recovered given its age and 
the change in company strategy?  
 
 
                 
 
f. To both the Auditor & Management: Do you think the new estimate is less/as/or more 
reasonable than the initial estimate, and why?  
 
 
                 
 
 
Assume some time has passed and it is now a different stage of the audit committee meeting and 
the issue of auditor compensation (audit fees) emerges.  Imagine the following dialogue:  
SCA Management: We would like to propose a 5% cut in audit fees. The economy is beginning to 
improve, but things are not yet up to speed and we are constantly under the pressure from our 
peers.  The most professional thing for us to do would be to use the money to invest in the growth 
of our business.   
XYZ Audit Firm: Please keep in mind we already decreased the audit fees for the past two years 
due to the financial crisis that affected us all. Further, we believe the inventory issue isn’t going 
away and new issues may arise, leading to an increase in the amount of testing we would need to 
conduct during our audit process.  Therefore, we think a 5% increase in fees is called for to 
allow us to conduct such additional procedures. 
Given the dialogue between SCA management and its external auditors, please indicate the 
change in audit fee you would be most supportive of.  
 
 
                 
  
| - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - |                   
-3             -2           -1                    0                      1           2                        3 
 
| - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - |                   
-3             -2           -1                    0                      1           2                        3 
 
Management’s 
Proposal 
 Auditor’s 
Proposal 
| - - - - - - - - |- - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - |  
5%                                    0%                   +5% 
No Change 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
 
Extremely 
 Likely 
 
Unlikely 
 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
 
Neutral 
 
Somewhat 
Likely 
 
Likely 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
 
Extremely 
 Likely 
 
Unlikely 
 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
 
Neutral 
 
Somewhat 
Likely 
 
Likely 
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Follow-up Questions 
How vulnerable would you characterize the firm’s investor base to be?  
 
                 
  
 
 
How sophisticated would you characterize the firm’s investor base to be?  
 
                 
 
 
 
How would you rate the expertise level of the firm’s investor base to be?  
 
                 
 
 
 
While completing the case, how much duty did you feel toward protecting the firm’s investors? 
 
                 
 
 
 
How would you rate the level at which the auditor’s report that was issued for SCA, would alert 
the financial statement users of the adjustment that resulted in the write-down of inventory? 
  
                 
  
| - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - |                   
-3              -2            -1                    0                      1           2                        3 
 
| - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - |                   
-3              -2            -1                    0                      1           2                        3 
 
| - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - |                   
-3              -2            -1                    0                      1           2                        3 
 
| - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - |                   
-3              -2            -1                    0                      1           2                        3 
 
| - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - |                   
-3              -2            -1                    0                      1           2                        3 
 
Extremely Not 
Vulnerable 
 
Extremely 
 Vulnerable 
 
Not 
Vulnerable 
 
Somewhat  
Not Vulnerable 
 
Neutral 
 
Somewhat 
Vulnerable 
 
Vulnerable 
 
Extremely 
Unsophisticated 
 
Extremely 
 Sophisticated 
 
Unsophisticated 
 
Somewhat  
Unsophisticated 
 
Neutral 
 
Somewhat 
Sophisticated 
 
Sophisticated 
 
Extremely  
Low 
 
Extremely 
 High 
 
Low 
 
Somewhat  
Low 
 
Neutral 
 
Somewhat 
High 
 
High 
 
Extremely  
Low 
 
Extremely 
 High 
 
Low 
 
Somewhat  
Low 
 
Neutral 
 
Somewhat 
High 
 
High 
 
Extremely  
Low 
 
Extremely 
 High 
 
Low 
 
Somewhat  
Low 
 
Neutral 
 
Somewhat 
High 
 
High 
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How would disclosing more information in the auditor’s report regarding a significant 
accounting issue related to SCA’s inventory valuation, affect the degree to which you would like 
the auditor and/or management to be questioned?  
 
 
                 
 
 
To what extent would an increase in the sophistication level, or a decrease in the vulnerability of 
the firm’s investor base, change the degree to which you would like the auditors and/or 
management to be questioned?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given SCA’s estimate for obsolete inventory changed from $4,000,000 to $970,000, please 
indicate your belief on the level of SCA’s external auditors’ competence (i.e., ability to detect 
misstatements should they exist). 
 
 
 
                 
 
               
Given SCA’s estimate for obsolete inventory changed from $4,000,000 to $970,000, please 
indicate your belief on the level of SCA’s external auditors’ independence/integrity (i.e., 
probability of reporting identified misstatements). 
| - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - |                   
-3              -2            -1                    0                      1           2                        3 
 
| - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - |                   
-3              -2            -1                    0                      1           2                        3 
 
| - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - |                   
-3              -2            -1                    0                      1           2                        3 
 
| - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - |                   
-3              -2            -1                    0                      1           2                        3 
 
Significant 
Lack of 
Integrity/ 
Independence 
 
Possess 
Significant 
Integrity/ 
Independence 
 
Lack Integrity/ 
Independence 
 
Slight Lack of 
Integrity/ 
Independence 
 
Neutral 
 
Possess 
Slight 
Integrity/ 
Independence 
 
Possess 
Integrity/ 
Independence 
 
Substantially 
Decrease 
Questioning 
 
Substantially 
Increase 
Questioning 
 
Decrease 
Questioning 
 
Slightly 
Decrease 
Questioning 
 
No Effect 
 
Slightly 
Increase 
Questioning 
 
Increase 
Questioning 
 
Substantially 
Decrease 
Questioning 
 
Substantially 
Increase 
Questioning 
 
Decrease 
Questioning 
 
Slightly 
Decrease 
Questioning 
 
No Effect 
 
Slightly 
Increase 
Questioning 
 
Increase 
Questioning 
 
Significantly 
Incompetent 
 
Significantly 
Competent 
 
Incompetent 
 
Slightly  
Incompetent 
 
Neutral 
 
Slightly 
Competent 
 
Competent 
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Demographic Questions 
 
Corporate governance experience:  please answer all that apply to you.   
 
1) Number of public company boards of directors you have served on:  _____ 
  
2) Number of private company boards of directors you have served on:  _____  
 
3) Number of not-for-profit boards of directors you have served on:  _____  
 
4) Total number of years that you have been an audit committee member: _____  
  
 
Are you the designated financial expert on any audit committees?  
 
Yes _____  No _____ 
 
 
At what level did you engage in asking questions in prior audit committee meetings?  
 
 
                 
 
 
 
Please rate your degree of knowledge/ability, compared to other audit committee members, of 
the following topics. 
 
1) Financial accounting - knowledge about how business activities are represented in financial 
statements. 
 
                 
 
  
Few, if any, are less 
knowledgeable than me 
| - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - -|      
1st                                      50th             99th  
Percentile                      Percentile                Percentile 
Few, if any, are more 
knowledgeable than me 
| - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - - |                   
-3              -2            -1                    0                      1           2                        3 
 Extremely  
Low 
 
Extremely 
High 
 
Low 
 
Somewhat 
Low 
 
Neutral 
 
Somewhat 
High 
 
High 
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2) Financial statement analysis - knowledge needed to analyze and interpret information 
contained in financial statements.  
 
                 
 
  
 
 
3) Auditing - knowledge about the auditor’s responsibilities, the types of audit reports issued, 
and the audit report’s meaning.  
 
                 
 
  
 
 
4) Audit committee best practice – knowledge about the audit committee’s responsibilities as 
representatives of shareholders 
 
                 
 
  
 
 
5) Industry used in this case study – knowledge about the specific industry the hypothetical firm 
in the cast study operates in 
 
                 
 
  
 
 
  
You have completed all the questions.   
Please make sure you click on the next button to save your responses. 
Thank you very much for your participation. 
Few, if any, are less 
knowledgeable than me 
| - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - -|      
1st                                      50th             99th  
Percentile                      Percentile                Percentile 
Few, if any, are more 
knowledgeable than me 
Few, if any, are less 
knowledgeable than me 
| - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - -|      
1st                                      50th             99th  
Percentile                      Percentile                Percentile 
Few, if any, are more 
knowledgeable than me 
Few, if any, are less 
knowledgeable than me 
| - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - -|      
1st                                      50th             99th  
Percentile                      Percentile                Percentile 
Few, if any, are more 
knowledgeable than me 
Few, if any, are less 
knowledgeable than me 
| - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - - | - - - -|      
1st                                      50th             99th  
Percentile                      Percentile                Percentile 
Few, if any, are more 
knowledgeable than me 
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FIGURE 1 
Effect of Audit Report Content and Investor Type 
Panel A: Prediction Based on the Self-Serving Perspective of Accountability (H1a) 
 
 
Panel B: Prediction Based on the Altruistic Perspective of Accountability (H1b) 
 
Disclosure_Lower Disclosure_Higher
Sophistication_High
Sophistication_Low
Propensity 
to Question 
Disclosure_Lower Disclosure_Higher
Sophistication_High
Sophistication_Low
Propensity to 
Question 
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Panel C: Observed Effects for Total Number of Questions 
 
 
 
Panel D: Observed Effects for Number of Probing Questions 
 
 
  
9.71 
4.05 
2.84 3.16 
Disclosure_Absent Disclosure_Present
Sophistication_High
Sophistication_Low
5.43 
2.05 2.21 
2.00 
Disclosure_Absent Disclosure_Present
Sophistication_High
Sophistication_Low
No. of 
Probing Qs 
No of 
Total Qs 
78 
 
FIGURE 2 
Experimental Procedures 
 
         Higher Disclosure Condition                               Lower Disclosure Condition 
 
  
 
Read case materials consisting of a brief company background including the investor base 
manipulation (unsophisticated vs. sophisticated) and content of the audit report 
manipulation (presence vs. absence of a recent change in standards regarding new 
disclosure requirements in the audit report) 
Read document prepared by the external auditors regarding a significant accounting 
estimate that emerged during the audit process. 
Review income statement and balance sheet reflecting two different amounts proposed by 
management related to the significant accounting estimate.  
View audit report with disclosures 
regarding commentary on the 
significant accounting estimate.  
View standard audit report with no 
additional disclosures. 
Complete questions regarding treatment of significant accounting estimate 
Develop questions to ask external auditors and/or management. 
Complete follow-up questionnaires including manipulation checks.  
Complete demographic questionnaires.   
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FIGURE 3 
Effect of Audit Report Content & Investor Type by Groups on Total Number of Questions 
Panel A: Designated Financial Experts 
 
 
Panel B: Non-Financial Experts 
 
12.15 
3.60 
2.70 3.20 
Disclosure_Absent Disclosure_Present
Sophistication_High
Sophistication_Low
No of Qs 
5.75 
4.42 
3.00 3.14 
Disclosure_Absent Disclosure_Present
Sophistication_High
Sophistication_Low
No of Qs 
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FIGURE 4 
Effect of Audit Report Content & Investor Type by Groups on  
Number of Probing Questions 
 
 
Panel A: Designated Financial Experts 
 
Panel B: Non-Financial Experts 
 
8.0 
1.9 
2.4 
1.6 
Disclosure_Absent Disclosure_Present
Sophistication_High
Sophistication_Low
No of  
Probing Qs 
1.3 
2.2 
2.0 2.1 
Disclosure_Absent Disclosure_Present
Sophistication_High
Sophistication_Low
No of  
Probing Qs 
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FIGURE 5 
Effect of Audit Report Content & Investor Type by Groups on  
Secondary Measures of AC’s Propensity to Question Management’s Estimate 
 
 
Panel A: Preferred Extent of Questioning on Accounting Issue 
 
 
Panel B: Likelihood of Asking Questions on Behalf of Financial Statement Users 
 
2.7 
2.4 2.5 
2.0 
Disclosure_Absent Disclosure_Present
Sophistication_High
Sophistication_Low
Preferred Extent 
of Questioning 
10.0 
8.8 8.9 
7.9 
Disclosure_Absent Disclosure_Present
Sophistication_High
Sophistication_Low
Likelihood of 
Questioning 
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FIGURE 6 
The Mediating Role of Perceived Comfort on the Effect of Audit Report Content on Audit 
Committee Members’ Propensity to Challenge Management’s Estimates 
  
Disclosure level of the audit 
report 
Higher = 1; Lower =0 
AC members’ propensity to 
challenge management’s 
significant accounting estimate 
AC members’ comfort level 
regarding the accounting issue 
Step 1: t = -3.46, p < 0.01* 
Step 4: t = -1.44, p = 0.17** 
Step 2 
t = 1.83 
P = 0.04* 
Step 3 
t = 1.83 
P = 0.02* + – 
– 
This figure summarizes tests of the mediating role of perceived comfort in the causal relation between the 
disclosure level of the audit report and the audit committee members’ propensity to challenge management’s 
significant accounting estimate.  
*p-values are one-tailed, given directional predictions.  
** two-tailed equivalent 
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TABLE 1 
Mapping of Main Dependent Measures with Corresponding Construct of Interest 
        
Main Dependent Measures* Corresponding Construct of Interest 
1. Likelihood of material misstatement Process measure on propensity to question management's estimates 
2. Perceived comfort about accounting 
decision (3 questions) 
Process measure on propensity to question 
management's estimates 
3. Preferred extent of questioning about 
management's estimate 
Propensity to question management's 
estimates 
4. Development of questions for management 
and/or auditors 
Propensity to question management's 
estimates 
5. Likelihood of asking questions on behalf of 
investors (6 questions) 
Propensity to question management's 
estimates 
6. Support for change in audit fee Propensity to support auditors (control variable) 
*The dependent measures are listed in the order they appear in the experiment. 
  
 
 
TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics on Participants' Relative Knowledge on Specific Issues 
            
  Issues 
  
Financial 
Accounting 
F/S 
Analysis Auditing 
AC Best 
Practice Case Industry 
Mean 80.8% 81.7% 79.2% 77.5% 50.7% 
Std. Deviation 16.5% 16.5% 19.3% 20.1% 25.9% 
Minimum 8.9% 9.2% 8.9% 8.9% 0.0% 
25th 
Percentile 74.2% 75.5% 69.0% 62.2% 29.0% 
Median 82.7% 85.0% 82.7% 81.3% 50.0% 
75th 
Percentile 91.1% 91.9% 95.3% 95.1% 71.9% 
Maximum 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
n 81 81 81 81 81 
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TABLE 3 
Main Analyses Based on Total Number of Questions 
Descriptive Statistics and Two-Way ANOVA 
              
Panel A: Mean [Standard Deviation] for total number of questions 
      Investor Sophistication 
      Lower Higher 
Disclosure in the Auditor's Report Absent 
2.84 
[0.95] 
N=19 
9.71 
[0.91] 
N=21 
    Present 
3.16 
[0.95] 
N=19 
4.05 
[0.89] 
N=22 
              
Panel B: Basic ANOVA model  
Source   Type III SS df Mean Square F-Ratio p-value 
Investor              303.59  1          303.59  17.63 <0.01 
Disclosure             144.48  1          144.48  8.39 <0.01 
Investor * Disclosure           180.58  1          180.58  10.48 <0.01 
Error          1,326.29  77 17.23     
              
Panel C: Planned contrast coding and follow-up simple effect tests     
Source     df Mean Square F-Ratio p-value* 
Overall tests:             
Audit committee members' level of questioning is  
greatest when there is less disclosure and the  
primary shareholders are sophisticated, lower when  
there is less disclosure and the primary shareholders  
are unsophisticated, and lowest when there is  
greater disclosure.  
1 353.73 20.54 <0.01 
Contrast Weights (3, 1, -2, -2)           
              
Follow-up simple effect tests:           
Effect of investor type given lower disclosure 1 471.09 27.35 <0.01 
Effect of disclosure given sophisticated investors 1 345.27 20.05 <0.01 
Effect of investor type given greater disclosure 1 8.03 0.47 0.50 
Effect of disclosure given unsophisticated investors 1 0.95 0.06 0.41 
 
* Reported p-values are two-tailed for the simple effect of investor type given the presence of disclosure in the audit 
report, and one-tailed equivalent for all other tests given my directional predictions.  
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TABLE 4 
Main Analyses Based on Number of Probing Questions 
Descriptive Statistics and Two-Way ANOVA 
              
Panel A: Mean [Standard Deviation] for number of probing questions 
      Investor Sophistication 
      Lower Higher 
Disclosure in the Auditor's Report Absent 
2.21 
[0.78] 
N=19 
5.43 
[0.74] 
N=21 
    Present 
2.00 
[0.78] 
N=19 
2.05 
[0.73] 
N=22 
              
Panel B: Basic ANOVA model  
Source   Type III SS df Mean Square F-Ratio p-value 
Investor                53.70  1            53.70  4.66 0.03 
Disclosure               65.11  1            65.11  5.65 0.02 
Investor * Disclosure             50.75  1            50.75  4.40 0.04 
Error             887.26  77 11.52     
              
Panel C: Planned contrast coding and follow-up simple effect tests     
Source     df Mean Square F-Ratio p-value* 
Overall tests:             
Audit committee members' level of questioning is  
greatest when there is less disclosure and the  
primary shareholders are sophisticated, lower when  
there is less disclosure and the primary shareholders  
are unsophisticated, and lowest when there is  
greater disclosure.  
1 123.94 10.76 <0.01 
Contrast Weights (3, 1, -2, -2)           
              
Follow-up simple effect tests:           
Effect of investor type given lower disclosure 1 103.3 8.97 <0.01 
Effect of disclosure given sophisticated investors 1 122.97 10.67 <0.01 
Effect of investor type given greater disclosure 1 0.02 0.002 0.50 
Effect of disclosure given unsophisticated investors 1 0.42 0.04 0.43 
 
* Reported p-values are two-tailed for the simple effect of investor type given the presence of disclosure in the audit 
report, and one-tailed equivalent for all other tests given my directional predictions.  
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TABLE 5 
Analyses on Secondary Measures of AC's Propensity to Question Management's Estimate 
              
Panel A: ANOVA of preferred extent of questioning management's estimate 
Source   Type III SS df Mean Square F-Ratio p-value 
Investor                  1.79  1 1.79 2.49 0.12 
Disclosure                 2.29  1 2.29 3.19 0.08 
Investor * Disclosure               0.14  1 0.14 0.20 0.66 
Error               55.38  77 0.72     
        
 
    
Panel B: ANOVA of likelihood of questioning on behalf of investors     
Source   Type III SS df Mean Square F-Ratio p-value 
Investor                20.77  1            20.77  3.60 0.06 
Disclosure               22.50  1            22.50  3.90 0.05 
Investor * Disclosure               0.39  1              0.39  0.07 0.80 
Error             443.85  77 5.76     
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TABLE 6 
Supplemental Analyses: 
Descriptive Statistics and Three-Way ANOVA of Total Number of Questions Asked 
  
Panel A: Mean [Standard Deviation] for total number of questions by groups   
      Financial Experts Non-Experts 
      
Investor 
Sophistication 
Investor 
Sophistication 
      Lower Higher Lower Higher 
Disclosure in Auditor's Report 
Absent 
2.70 
[1.42] 
N=10 
12.15 
[1.25] 
N=13 
3.00 
[1.11] 
N=9 
5.75 
[1.17] 
N=8 
Present 
3.20 
[2.01] 
N=5 
3.60 
[1.42] 
N=10 
3.14 
[0.89] 
N=14 
4.42 
[0.96] 
N=12 
              
Panel B: Basic ANOVA model           
Source   Type III SS df 
Mean 
Square F-Ratio p-value 
Investor    
         
221.93  1          221.93  14.48 <0.01 
Disclosure   
           
98.48  1            98.48  6.42 0.01 
Expert   
           
32.91  1            32.91  2.15 0.15 
Investor * Disclosure   
         
127.77  1          127.77  8.34 <0.01 
Investor * Expert   
           
39.17  1            39.17  2.56 0.11 
Disclosure * Expert   
           
54.28  1            54.28  3.54 0.06 
Investor * Disclosure * Expert 
           
66.17  1            66.17  4.32 0.04 
Error   
      
1,119.12  73            15.33      
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TABLE 6 (cont.) 
Panel C: Planned contrast coding and follow-up simple effect tests 
Source     df Mean Square F-Ratio p-value* 
Financial Experts             
Overall tests:             
Audit committee members' level of questioning is  
greatest when there is less disclosure and the primary  
shareholders are sophisticated, lower when there is  
less disclosure and the primary shareholders are  
unsophisticated, and lowest when there is greater  
disclosure.  
1 327.96 21.39 <0.01 
Contrast Weights (3, 1, -2, -2)         
              
Follow-up simple effect tests:             
Effect of investor type given lower disclosure   1 505.16 32.95 <0.01 
Effect of disclosure given sophisticated investors   1 413.56 26.98 <0.01 
Effect of investor type given greater disclosure   1 0.53 0.04 0.85 
Effect of disclosure given unsophisticated investors   1 0.83 0.04 0.42 
              
Non-Experts             
Overall tests:             
Audit committee members' level of questioning is  
greatest when there is less disclosure and the primary  
shareholders are sophisticated, lower when there is  
less disclosure and the primary shareholders are  
unsophisticated, and lowest when there is greater  
disclosure.  
1 14.19 0.93 0.17 
Contrast Weights (3, 1, -2, -2)         
 
* Reported p-values are two-tailed for the simple effect of investor type given the presence of disclosure in the audit 
report, and one-tailed equivalent for all other tests given my directional predictions.  
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TABLE 7 
Supplemental Analyses: 
Descriptive Statistics and Three-Way ANOVA of Number of Probing Questions Asked 
  
Panel A: Mean [Standard Deviation] for number of probing questions by groups   
      Financial Experts Non-Experts 
      Investor Sophistication 
Investor 
Sophistication 
      Lower Higher Lower Higher 
Disclosure in Auditor's 
Report 
Absent 
2.40 
[1.13] 
N=10 
8.00 
[0.99] 
N=13 
2.00 
[0.80] 
N=9 
1.25 
[0.85] 
N=8 
Present 
1.60 
[1.60] 
N=5 
1.90 
[1.13] 
N=10 
2.14 
[0.65] 
N=14 
2.17 
[0.70] 
N=12 
              
Panel B: Basic ANOVA model           
Source   Type III SS df 
Mean 
Square F-Ratio p-value 
Investor    
           
30.85  1            30.85  3.42 0.07 
Disclosure   
           
39.31  1            39.31  4.35 0.04 
Expert   
           
46.33  1            46.33  5.13 0.03 
Investor * Disclosure   
           
23.61  1            23.61  2.61 0.11 
Investor * Expert   
           
50.60  1            50.60  5.60 0.02 
Disclosure * Expert   
           
73.01  1            73.01  8.08 <0.01 
Investor * Disclosure * Expert 
           
42.51  1            42.51  4.71 0.03 
Error   
         
659.38  73              9.03      
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TABLE 7 (cont.) 
Panel C: Planned contrast coding and follow-up simple effect tests 
Source     df Mean Square F-Ratio p-value* 
Financial Experts             
Overall tests:             
Audit committee members' level of questioning is  
greatest when there is less disclosure and the primary  
shareholders are sophisticated, lower when there is  
less disclosure and the primary shareholders are  
unsophisticated, and lowest when there is greater  
disclosure.  
1 188.91 14.85 <0.01 
Contrast Weights (3, 1, -2, -2)         
              
Follow-up simple effect tests:             
Effect of investor type given lower disclosure   1 177.25 13.93 <0.01 
Effect of disclosure given sophisticated investors   1 210.32 16.53 <0.01 
Effect of investor type given greater disclosure   1 0.30 0.02 0.44 
Effect of disclosure given unsophisticated investors   1 2.13 0.17 0.35 
              
Non-Experts             
Overall tests:             
Audit committee members' level of questioning is  
greatest when there is less disclosure and the primary  
shareholders are sophisticated, lower when there is  
less disclosure and the primary shareholders are  
unsophisticated, and lowest when there is greater  
disclosure.  
1 4.44 0.76 0.19 
Contrast Weights (3, 1, -2, -2)         
 
* Reported p-values are two-tailed for the simple effect of investor type given the presence of disclosure in the audit 
report, and one-tailed equivalent for all other tests given my directional predictions.  
 
 
